Showing posts with label Andrew L. Colborn. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Andrew L. Colborn. Show all posts

Jun 14, 2019

Wisconsin Cop Asks Federal Court to Gut Landmark First Amendment Case

Manitowoc County Sheriff Lt. Andrew Colborn (ret)
has included an argument in his federal defamation
suit against the creators and distributors of Making a
Murderer that seeks to eviscerate First Amendment
protections exemplified in the First Amendment
case, New York Times v Sullivan

Making a Murderer case seen as vehicle to revisit New York Times v. Sullivan, reorder libel law, per Justice Clarence Thomas


Update
II: Settlement talks and remediation proceedings did not result in a resolution, (Colborn v Netflix), March 2021.


Update: In July 2019, U.S. District Judge Pamela Pepper published a NOTICE of Hearing on pending motions set for December 19, 2019.

It appears likely Judge Pepper will dismiss Colborn's legal action, Colborn v. Netflix, Inc (1:19-cv-00484).

Just as likely, Colborn will appeal the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
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Madison, Wisconsin — Manitowoc County Sheriff Lt. Andrew Colborn (ret) is the face of Wisconsin law enforcement — provincial, unschooled and corrupt.

To Colborn, featured in the Emmy-winning Making a Murderer for framing Steven Avery and committing perjury in court, Wisconsin citizens are enemies, subjects to be conquered at will.

Now, Colborn has included an argument in his federal defamation suit against the creators and distributors of Making a Murderer that seeks to eviscerate First Amendment protections exemplified in the First Amendment case, New York Times v Sullivan.

In Wisconsin, because of law enforcement's prevailing conception of America exemplified by former electoral candidate Colborn's actions, frame-ups, character assassinations and wrongful convictions are per force just when perpetrated by law enforcement.

Andrew Colborn filed a defamation suit against the Making a Murderer creators, Laura Ricciardi and Moira Demos, Netflix, Inc and others in Manitowoc County Wisconsin Circuit Court in Dec 2018,  (Andrew L. Colborn v. Netflix Inc., Chrome Media LLC, Laura Ricciardi, Moira Demos, Lisa Nishimura, Adam Del Deo, Mary Manhardt, and Synthesis Film LLC).

Plaintiff Colborn's action accuses Netlix, Inc and other defendants of having "omitted, distorted, and falsified material and significant facts in an effort to portray Plaintiff [Andrew Colborn] as a corrupt police officer who planted evidence to frame an innocent man," (Appleton Post-Crescent).

Colborn's case is intended to shield police against citizens' speech and negative coverage in the press.

This is the first time in this litigation Colborn explicitly calls for the Court to revisit a foundational First Amendment case, New York Times v Sullivan.

Colborn v. Netflix was removed to federal court in April 2019, United States District Court, Eastern District of Wisconsin, (WBAY, Appleton Post-Crescent). The federal case is: Colborn v. Netflix, Inc (1:19-cv-00484).

The case is being heard by Judge Pamela Pepper, United States District Judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

Colborn though his attorney, George Burnett, argues in his June 13, 2019 brief in opposition to Netflix' May 9, 2019 motion to dismiss. The Netflix motion to dismiss argues in part the failure of Colborn to meet the low threshold of stating a claim upon which relief can be granted, citing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 12(b)(6).

Burnett's argument in reply is weak.

But it is Burnett-Colborn's plea for revisiting New York Times v Sullivan that should cause concern among those favoring constitutional liberties so despised by Wisconsin law enforcement.

The argument against Sullivan is included to preserve an argument, should the case survive the motion to dismiss and proceed through the federal court system.

Still, upending Sullivan and 55 years of First Amendment and libel jurisprudence is a Hail Mary pass times 100.

Reached for comment, Howard Schweber, an expert in constitutional law, judicial politics, free speech, and democratic theory at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, acclaimed the prominence of the First Amendment.

The first thing to know is that the Coborn brief and this argument (apparently) both rely on a single source of authority: Justice Thomas concurring opinion in an earlier case. Except that it wasn't really a "case", it was a denial of cert (the Supreme Court declining to hear an appeal from the First Circuit from the dismissal of a defamation claim brought by Bill Cosby against an actress who accused him of rape).

The thing is, no other justice joined that opinion, nor am I aware of any other justice who has ever advocating revisiting Sullivan in this way. And Thomas takes lots of positions in which he stands alone, such as his argument that the Establishment Clause does not apply to states at all. Thomas defends these positions on strict originalist grounds; the late Justice Scalia was talking about Thomas when he said "I may be an originalist but I'm not a nut".

So in any ordinary time I would say this is a hopeless Hail Mary legal argument with essentially zero chance of success. But it is possible that we are entering extraordinary times in constitutional doctrine, especially where the First Amendment is concerned. President Trump has publicly called for a reconsideration of the Sullivan rule, and the Republican Senate has been extremely effective in filling judicial seats with extremely right wing candidates in ways that have bypassed almost all existing checks and procedures in favor of speed and efficiency. As a result, there is a cadre of federal judges, all recently appointed, who are preselected to be open to reconsideration of settled doctrines across a range of issues. We also have a Supreme Court that features Brett Kavanaugh, who might have personal reasons to want to see the freedom to say bad things about public figures subjected to some restraints. So these lawyers may be gambling that the time is ripe for a shocking victory against the body of existing precedent.

One final comment is that there are actually very good reasons for reconsidering the scope of the Sullivan doctrine, but this particular case does not raise those reasons for consideration. The original doctrine applied only to claims of libel by elected officials. In subsequent cases the scope of the doctrine was extended to include "public figures" such as actors, musicians, and athletes. People have become "involuntary public figures" by virtue of having been involved in events through no fault of their own, and in some cases the Sullivan principle has been extended to include essentially any matter of "public interest", which results in a near-total obviation of privacy rights that would otherwise apply. It is not a coincidence that no other constitutional court has chosen to follow our Supreme Court's lead on this issue. Constitutional courts in Australia, New Zealand, and Europe have considered the American Sullivan rule and rejected it, especially as applied beyond public officials.

In this case, of course, the plaintiffs are public officials, so this is what might be called a "core" Sullivan case. It is certainly highly unlikely that any lower federal court will take it upon itself to accept these arguments, but a request to reconsider settled doctrine is not aimed at the trial court, it is aimed directly at the Supreme Court. I find it very hard to imagine this Court overruling or altering Sullivan, but then a lot of things have happened in recent years that I would have thought unimaginable in quieter times.

On a larger note, we tend to forget that our system of constitutional law periodically goes through periods of fairly dramatic reinterpretation in which arguments that had previously been thought fringe become mainstream. To take only one example, for a century the idea that the Second Amendment secured an individual right to own guns was considered absurd, yet given the right constellation of political and legal developments we got the Heller decision.

It appears likely this argument doubles as a plea for President Donald Trump's political attention, in light of Trump's oft-expressed disdain for speech critical of public figures, (New York Times).

Colborn's argument in the brief, (pp 14-16), is reproduced below:

 I. The “Actual Malice” Requirement Should Be Reconsidered.

 In a recent concurrence to a denial of a petition for certiorari , United States Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas opined that it is time for the Court to reconsider its jurisprudence under New York Times v. Sullivan in an appropriate case. As explained below, this is an appropriate case. Therefore, while this argument is directed to the United States Supreme Court, it is stated briefly here in order to preserve the opportunity to seek review. The central point of Justice Thomas’ argument is that there was no First or Fourteenth Amendment basis for the “actual malice” rule adopted in New York Times v. Sullivan, supra, and that it was instead merely a policy that the Court instituted in response to the facts presented in the case. McKee v. Cosby, --- U.S. ---, 139 S.Ct. 675, 676 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring).

The New York Times case came before the Court by way of a defamation complaint filed by a southern police official who claimed that his reputation had been injured by a political advertisement that decried alleged violations of civil rights. Some of the facts stated in the advertisement were conceded to have been false, and the New York Times admitted that it had not investigated any of the facts nor even consulted its own articles about the events described,  but instead relied on the reputations of individuals whose names were listed in the advertisement as supporting its content. 376 U.S. 257-61. After surveying writings by James Madison that attacked the Sedition Act of 1798, which criminalized criticism of government, the Supreme Court declared in New York Times that Madison’s writings supported the proposition that state libel laws prohibiting false defamation of government officials violate the First Amendment. 376 U.S. 273-77. But as Justice Thomas  pointed out in McKee, that conclusion represented a leap of logic:

 . . . constitutional opposition to the Sedition Act — a federal law directly criminalizing criticism of the Government — does not necessarily support a constitutional actual-malice rule in all civil libel actions brought by public figures.

139 S.Ct. at 682. Moreover, as Justice Thomas further explained, Madison’s writings both supported the view that public officials wronged by false statements should have redress under the law and opposed the concept of federally-dictated libel laws. Id. Yet, the Supreme Court has recognized that New York Times v. Sullivan has resulted in the federalization of libel law.  Id. at 676 (citing and quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 370 (1974)).

In adopting the policy that it embraced in  New York Times v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court  purported to seek a balance between the “breathing space”  that the Court contended must be afforded statements critical of public officials and the notion that the press should not be afforded wholesale license to inflict reputational harm at whim. 376 U.S. at 271-72 (internal 15 quotation and citation omitted). This case illustrates precisely the abuses that have proliferated as a result of the balance that the Court attempted to strike. Netflix asserts in this case that it may freely distribute defamatory statements that accuse a small-town police officer of  participating in a criminal conspiracy in the course of his work, exposing him to worldwide opprobrium, without the slightest responsibility or accountability for the truth of those statements, hiding under the shield of the First Amendment, but all the while reaping riches that it derived from destroying Plaintiff’s reputation.

Netflix argues that it has the judicially-sanctioned right to deprive Plaintiff of his good reputation and to transform it into a commodity that it can distort for its own profit. It is unlikely that the Supreme Court imagined that its ruling in New York Times v. Sullivan would be used in such a way. Plaintiff respectfully requests that the United States Supreme Court reconsider the actual malice standard to the extent that it is asserted to protect this conduct. ...
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Has Justice Thomas detected a leap of logic in Sullivan?

Colborn's response brief is reproduced in full below:

Colborn Response by on Scribd

May 15, 2019

First Amendment Liberties Scorned by Wisconsin Cop Who Helped Frame Innocent Man

Update: In July 2019, U.S. District Judge Pamela Pepper published a NOTICE of Hearing on pending motions set for December 19, 2019.

It appears likely Judge Pepper will dismiss Colborn's legal action, Colborn v. Netflix, Inc (1:19-cv-00484).

Just as likely, Colborn will appeal the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
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Madison, Wisconsin — A corrupt ex-cop and a former Manitowoc County prosecutor filed a December 2018 lawsuit against the creators and distributors of the Emmy-winning Making a Murderer.

Manitowoc County Sheriff Dept Lt. Andrew Colborn (ret) and rightwing attorney and former Manitowoc County Asst DA, Michael C. Griesbach, filed this shockingly unschooled civil action charging defamation of  Colborn, in the documentary Making a Murderer, (Colborn v. Netflix Inc et al, Case # 1:19-cv-00484, Mal Contends, Dec 2018 Summons and Complaint, March 4, 2019 Amended Complaint).

Making a Murderer focused worldwide attention on the corrupt police-prosecutor-prison complex in east-central Wisconsin, and an equally corrupt Wisconsin Dept of Justice, a matter of grave public interest.

The case was removed to federal court, United States District Court, Eastern District of Wisconsin, on April 4, (WBAY, Appleton Post-Crescent). The federal civil case is: Colborn v. Netflix Inc (1:19-cv-00484).

The rightwing Federalist Society-linked presiding Judge William C. Griesbach, brother of attorney Michael C. Griesbach, recused on April 5.

Colborn's lawsuit is a clumsy attempt to cover up a police frame-up of the wrongfully convicted Steven Avery, featured in Making a Murderer.

The civil litigation is also a window into how corrupt Wisconsin law enforcement views the world — a realm of malignant narcissism in which police action is inherently righteous to the point of monarchical, and liberties and human rights are seen as obstacles to overcome in a society in which citizens are ruled by the caprice of police and political-legal allies.

Recent motions by Netflix, Inc and others to dismiss Colborn's action are almost certain to prevail in federal court, (Mueller, Appleton Post-Crescent, Mal Contends).

The retired public official Colborn's complaint written by attorney Griesbach, (and a March 4, 2019 amended complaint), assert Colborn is not a public official under defamation law; nor a "public figure" or "limited purpose public figure," (p. 7. March 4, 2019 Amended Complaint).

Such a status might offer Colborn a measure of protection (though limited) from what otherwise is First Amendment-protected speech, and privileged speech of Making a Murderer.

Writes Griesbach:

Statement of Facts

1. Plaintiff, Andrew L. Colborn, is a former Manitowoc County Sheriff's Office police officer. Plaintiff retired in March of 2018 after serving twenty-six years in public service. At no time during his employment at the Manitowoc County Sheriff's Office (hereafter, MTSO) did plaintiff serve as public official as that term is defined in defamation law.

Preposterous.

Madison, Wisconsin attorney James A. Friedman, representing Netflix, Inc and others demolishes Colborn's implausible characterization of facts.

Writes Friedman:

Colborn is public offical

I. Colborn is a public official.Whether a defamation plaintiff is a public official is a threshold question of law for the court,  Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 88 & n.15 (1966), and presents an issue of federal constitutional law, not state law, Meiners v. Moriarity , 563 F.2d 343, 352 (7th Cir. 1977).

The Supreme Court has recognized, on multiple occasions, that police and other law enforcement officers are quintessentially “public officials” for these purposes. In Sullivan itself, the plaintiff was the official in charge of law enforcement in Montgomery, Alabama. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256. Four years after Sullivan, in St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. at 730 & n.2, the Court held that a deputy sheriff had failed to prove the actual malice necessary for him to prevail in a defamation action. And, three years after that, the Court similarly concluded that a Chicago police detective had failed to demonstrate the requisite actual malice. See Time, Inc. v. Pape , 401 U.S. 279, 284, 292 (1971). In so holding, the Court embraced the Seventh Circuit’s prior decision that such a plaintiff is a public official as a matter of law. See Pape v. Time, Inc. , 354 F.2d 558, 560 (7th Cir. 1965); see also Pape v. Time, Inc. , 419 F.2d 980, 981 (7th Cir. 1969).

Not surprisingly, courts throughout the country have since followed the Supreme Court’s lead and overwhelmingly held that law enforcement officers, from patrol officers to police chiefs, are public officials within the meaning of Sullivan and its progeny. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals, for example, has recognized that a police chief is a public official because he is, by definition, “a local government employee charged with protecting the public interest in law enforcement.” Pronger v. O’Dell, 127 Wis. 2d 292, 295, 379 N.W.2d 330, 331-32 (Ct. App. 1985);  see also Miller v. Minority Bhd. of Fire  Prot.  58 Wis. 2d 589, 599-601, 463 N.W.2d 690, 694-95 (Ct. App. 1990) (concluding that fire department captain is a public official and favorably citing other courts’ holdings that sheriff’s deputies, police officers and state troopers also qualify as public officials). Similarly, federal appellate courts throughout the country have not hesitated to apply the public official designation to those working in law enforcement. See, e.g. , McGunigle v. City of Quincy, 835 F.3d 192, 206 (1st Cir. 2016) (police officer);  Revell v.  Hoffman , 309 F.3d 1228, 1232-33 (10th Cir. 2002) (former Associate Deputy Director of FBI); Rattray v. City of Nat’l City , 36 F.3d 1480, 1486 (9th Cir. 1994) (police officer), modified and superseded on denial of rehearing on other grounds , 51 F.3d 793 (9th Cir. 1994); Zerangue v. TSP Newspapers, Inc., 814 F.2d 1066, 1069-70 (5th Cir. 1987) (chief deputy sheriff and chief of detectives in sheriff’s office); Coughlin v. Westinghouse  Broad. & Cable, Inc. , 780 F.2d 340, 342 (3d Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (police officer); Meiners, 563 F.2d at 352 (federal narcotics agent).

More specifically, courts have regularly held that sheriff’s deputies—even those with fewer responsibilities than Colborn had as a sergeant, shift commander, and patrol supervisor—are public officials within the meaning of Sullivan. See, e.g., Zerangue , 814 F.2d at 1069-70; Karr v. Townsend, 606 F. Supp. 1121, 1131 (W.D. Ark. 1985) (sheriff’s deputy is public official); Hirman v. Rogers, 257 N.W.2d 563, 566 (Minn. 1977) (same); Pardo v. Simons , 148 S.W.3d 181, 189 (Tex. App. 2004) (same); Murray v. Lineberry, 69 S.W.3d 560, 563 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (same). (5)
These holdings make perfect sense given the First Amendment’s overarching commitment to promoting “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” debate about those responsible for performing important governmental functions: [T]he ‘public official’ designation applies at the very least to those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs. . . . Where a position in government has such apparent importance that the public has an independent interest in the qualifications and performance of the person who holds it, beyond the general public interest in the qualifications and performance of all government employees, . . . the  New York Times  [actual] malice standards apply. Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 85-86. Law enforcement officers such as Colborn comfortably meet this standard. They are, as multiple decisions note, members of “quasi-military” -

For additional state court precedent, see Turner v. Devlin , 848 P.2d 286, 290 & n.8 (Ariz. 1993) (police officer); Gomes v. Fried, 136 Cal. App. 3d 924, 933-34 (1982) (police officer);  Moriarty v. Lippe, 294 A.2d 330-32 (Conn. 1972) (patrol officer); Jackson v. Filliben , 281 A.2d 604, 605 (Del. 1971) (police sergeant); Smith v. Russell, 456 So. 2d 462, 463-64 (Fla. 1984) (police officer);  Rawlins v. Hutchinson Publ’g Co., 543 P.2d 988, 992 (Kan. 1975) (police officer); Roche v. Egan, 433 A.2d 757, 762 (Me. 1981) (all law enforcement personnel, including police detective); Rotkiewicz v. Sadowsky, 730 N.E.2d 282, 288 (Mass. 2000) (police officer); Malerba v. Newsday, Inc., 406 N.Y.S.2d 552, 554 (App. Div. 1978) (patrolman); Colombo v. Times-Argus Ass'n, 380 A.2d 80, 83 (Vt. 1977) (police officer); Starr v. Beckley Newspapers Corp., 201 S.E.2d 911, 913 (W. Va. 1974) (police sergeant).

- organizations who carry guns and who possess the authority not only to arrest but also, in some circumstances, to take human life. See, e.g., Pool v. VanRheen, 297 F.3d 899, 909 (9th Cir. 2002) (referring to sheriff’s department as “quasi-military entity”); Kokkinis v.  Ivkovich , 185 F.3d 840, 846 (7th Cir. 1999) (same, as to police department); Eiland v. City of Montgomery, 797 F.2d 953, 960 (11th Cir. 1986) (same); Easley v. Kirmsee, 235 F. Supp. 2d 945, 957 (E.D. Wis. 2002) (finding that sheriff’s deputies receive training “on all aspects of a law enforcement officer’s duties and responsibilities, including the use of force, both deadly and non-deadly [and] the use of firearms”), aff’d on other  grounds , 382 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2004); Caraballo v. Cty. of Sawyer, 2013 WI App 1, ¶ 4, 345 Wis. 2d 398, 824 N.W.2d 929 (table) (Wis. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam) (unpublished) (sheriff’s deputies’ discretionary duties include shackling prisoners, as well as enforcing compliance with commands by use of physical force and chemical agents);  see also Wis. Stat. § 59.27 (enumerating duties of Sheriffs and their deputies).

Given Colborn’s responsibilities and privileges as a sheriff’s deputy, sergeant and shift commander—which were apparently significant enough to qualify him to be the Republican nominee in the 2006 election for Manitowoc County Sheriff (6) —there can be no doubt either that he had “substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs,” or that the public has a compelling interest in scrutinizing his -

6 Although it is not necessary for the Court to reach the issue given Colborn’s status as a public official, he is also obliged to plead and prove actual malice because he is a “public figure.” See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 335. Should this case proceed to discovery, all Defendants reserve their right to argue via a motion for summary judgment that Colborn’s 2006 campaign for Sheriff, his statements to the press about the Avery verdict, and his role in the investigation and prosecution of Halbach’s murder render him a limited purpose public figure.

- performance of his official duties. As the Wisconsin Court of Appeals has explained: “[T]here is no more awesome power exercised by government than that of the police. The  police have literally the power of life and death over citizens they are to protect . . . .” State ex rel. Journal/Sentinel, Inc. v. Arreola, 207 Wis. 2d 496, 516, 558 N.W.2d 670, 677 (Ct. App. 1996). As a result, “the public has a particularly strong interest in being informed about its . . . law enforcement officers.”  Hutchins v. Clarke , 661 F.3d 947, 955 (7th Cir. 2011);  see also Gray v. Udevitz, 656 F.2d 588, 591 (10th Cir. 1981) (police officer is public official for defamation purposes because “[m]isuse of his authority can result in significant deprivation of constitutional rights and personal freedoms, not to mention bodily injury and financial loss”). (7)

7  For these same reasons, in the context of disputes over open records requests, Wisconsin courts have repeatedly emphasized the need for the public to monitor the conduct of law enforcement officers. See, e.g. , Kroeplin v. Wis.  Dep’t of Nat. Res., 297 Wis. 2d 254, 287, 725 N.W.2d 286, 302 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006) (“The public interest in being informed both of the potential misconduct by law enforcement officers and of the extent to which such misconduct was properly investigated is particularly compelling . . . .”);  Hempel v. City of Baraboo, 2003 WI App 254, ¶ 18, 268 Wis. 2d 534, 548, 674 N.W.2d 38, 45 (“Police officers must necessarily expect close public scrutiny.”), aff’d on other grounds , 284 Wis. 2d 162, 699 N.W.2d 551 (2005).

Why would Colborn argue through his attorneys demonstrably false, vacuous and conclusory pleadings that this former law enforcement officer and two-time political candidate for elective office is not a public official, or public figure under defamation law?

It's the way things are in Manitowoc and Calumet counties in east-central Wisconsin law enforcement. The police can say and do virtually anything and corrupt officials in the Wisconsin Dept of Justice will provide cover, running legal and political interference. See #CorruptiwocCounty. So, a less-than-sophisticated understanding of the liberties of the citizenry is to be expected.
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Netflix Motion's Footnote 8

Another revealing aspect in Colborn's litigation is noted in a humorous footnote, #8 (p. 19), in Netflix' May 9, 2019 motion to dismiss.

The Netlifx motion takes note of Colborn's argument in his amended complaint that Netflix and the filmmakers did not "admit" the factuality of, and include in Making a Murderer (2015) the arguments and "[t]horough, careful, and objective analysis by some members of the public and a few journalists [that] revealed that the series had badly distorted the facts," as advanced in a 2016 book authored by attorney Michael Griesbach, (the aforementioned author of the original 2018 complaint against Netflix and others), in Indefensable: The Missing Truth About Steven Avery, Teresa Halbach, and Making A Murderer (Kensington Publ’g Corp. 2016).

Reads the Netflix motion's footnote 8:

8 The Amended Complaint also alleges that all Defendants acted with actual malice because they have refused to “admit[] their distortions and omissions of fact” in the wake of “[t]horough, careful, and objective analysis by some members of the public and a few journalists [that] revealed that the series had badly distorted the facts.” Dkt. 1-2 ¶ 55. Here, the Amended Complaint makes a not-so-veiled reference to a book criticizing MaM published by Colborn’s counsel that mirrors many of the allegations in the Amended Complaint. See generally Michael Griesbach, INDEFENSIBLE: THE MISSING TRUTH ABOUT STEVEN AVERY,  TERESA HALBACH, AND MAKING  A  MURDERER  (Kensington Publ’g Corp. 2016). This detour is, however, irrelevant to the issue of actual malice, which is measured at the time of publication, not afterwards. Pippen, 734 F.3d at 614. 

Netflix and others' Memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss notes deficiencies in the law enforcement officer Colborn's amended defamation complaint on First Amendment grounds; and on the failure to meet the low threshold of stating a claim upon which relief can be granted, citing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 12(b)(6).

Another motion notes improper service and apparent deceit committed by agents of the plaintiff, Colborn.

May 10, 2019

Netflix Makes Motion to Dismiss Defamation Suit Filed by Retired Manitowoc County Cop — Andrew Colborn

First Amendment and Failed Legal Claim Expected to Drop Wisconsin Cop's Effort to Silence Critics of Police Frame-up


Update: In July 2019, U.S. District Judge Pamela Pepper published a NOTICE of Hearing on pending motions set for December 19, 2019.

It appears likely Judge Pepper will dismiss Colborn's legal action, Colborn v. Netflix, Inc (1:19-cv-00484).

Just as likely, Colborn will appeal the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
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Madison, Wisconsin — The distributor of the Emmy-winning Making a Murderer documentary series, Netflix, Inc, is asking a federal court to dismiss a defamation lawsuit filed by a retired lieutenant of the Manitowoc County Sheriff's Office, (ANDREW L. COLBORN, Plaintiff, vs. Civil No.: 19-CV-484 NETFLIX, INC.; CHROME MEDIA LLC, F/K/A SYNTHESIS FILMS, LLC; LAURA RICCIARDI; AND MOIRA DEMOS, Defendants. MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS BY NETFLIX, INC) (May 9, 2019).

Lt. Andrew Colborn (ret) filed an assault-defamation action against Netflix, Inc and others on Dec 17, 2018.

Netflix and others' Memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss notes deficiencies in the law enforcement officer Colborn's amended defamation complaint on First Amendment grounds; and on the failure to meet the low threshold of stating a claim upon which relief can be granted, citing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 12(b)(6)

Reads the motion:

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS BY NETFLIX, INC

Andrew L. Colborn, a sworn law enforcement officer, brings this lawsuit over a documentary television series that uses the unique experiences of Steven Avery, a DNA exoneree charged with murder, to provide a window into the American criminal justice system. Taking viewers from Avery’s 1985 wrongful conviction for rape through his 2005 arrest and prosecution for murder, the series explores whether twenty years of scientific advances and legislative reforms have resulted in a more reliable system. As is obvious from even this brief summary, as well as the nationwide, contemporaneous media coverage of Avery’s prosecution and trial, the series—titled  Making a Murderer— explores issues of the utmost public interest and concern.

Given the subject matter of  Making a Murderer and Colborn’s status as a public official, to prevail in this defamation case, he must plead and prove that Defendants  published the documentary series with “actual malice”—i.e., either knowing it was false or despite a “high degree of awareness” of its “probable falsity.” Garrison v. Louisiana , 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964). Even if Colborn were not a public official, he would still be obliged to plead and prove that Defendants negligently disseminated a material falsehood about him. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. , 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974).

With regard to defendant Netflix, Inc., however, Colborn’s Amended Complaint comes nowhere close to satisfying federal pleading standards. Instead, he simply lumps Netflix together with co-defendants Chrome Media, LLC—the concededly independent production company that created Making a Murderer —and its filmmakers, Laura Ricciardi and Moira Demos, and makes vague, conclusory allegations (on “information and belief,” no less) about “defendants” collectively.

Setting aside all the other problems with Colborn’s lawsuit—most fundamentally, that Making a Murderer contains no false statements of fact about him—he has not plausibly alleged that Netflix distributed the documentary series negligently, much less with the requisite actual malice. All of his claims against Netflix should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
1 See, e.g., Monica Davey, Freed by DNA, Now Charged in New Crime, NYTimes.com (Nov. 23, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/23/us/freed-by-dna-now-charged-in-new-crime.html?searchResultPosition=1.

Correction: Motion to dismiss includes remaining co-defendants, (Appleton Post-Crescent).


The effort by Colborn and former Manitowoc County prosecutor Michael C. Griesbach to advance a legal action based upon failing arguments is consistent with the institutional disregard for life and liberty in the corrupt Manitowoc County Sheriff's Office and Calumet County Sheriff's Office and respective county district attorneys' offices.

Advocates for Steven Avery, who was framed for murder in 2005, are watching the developments of what they believe is an increasingly desperate Wisconsin law enforcement effort to protect a wrongful conviction.

Colborn v. Netflix Inc et al, Case # 1:19-cv-00484, was removed from Manitowoc County circuit court to federal court on April 10, 2019. 

The case is being heard by Judge Pamela Pepper, United States District Judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

The text of the Motion to Dismiss is reproduced below:

Apr 11, 2019

Wisconsin Sheriff Deputy's Defamation Suit Against Making a Murderer Appears Doomed

Manitowoc County Sheriff Dept Lt. Andrew Colborn, (Ret),
was implicated in misconduct in the second Steven Avery
frame-up, becoming a major disgraced public figure, as
documented in Making a Murderer, and Wrecking Crew,
Demolishing The Case Against Steven Avery
, (Ferak),
and demonstrated at public trial.

Law enforcement civil action against critics of official conduct fades against reason and public discussion by two filmmakers advocating for two wrongfully convicted men, and the truth that will set them free


Update: In July 2019, U.S. District Judge Pamela Pepper published a NOTICE of Hearing on pending motions set for December 19, 2019.

It appears likely Judge Pepper will dismiss Colborn's legal action, Colborn v. Netflix, Inc (1:19-cv-00484).

Just as likely, Colborn will appeal the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.

Updated: Critics of corruption in the Manitowoc County Sheriff's Office point out that Sheriff Deputy Andrew Colborn (ret) was a candidate for elected public office, the Republican Party nominee for Manitowoc County Sheriff in 2006. This fact appears to further disconfirm the former public-office candidate Colborn's claim that this 26-year public servant is not a public official under defamation law, a status that renders the speech in Making a Murderer privileged speech, (Screen-shot of the Manitowoc Herald-Times, 2006, Reddit).
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Madison, Wisconsin — Recent developments in the assault-defamation action brought by a retired lieutenant of the Manitowoc County Sheriff's Office have First Amendment defenders, the Making a Murderer creators and advocates of wrongful-conviction victims happy this week.

Retired Manitowoc County Sheriff Office Lt. Andrew Colborn, who allegedly helped frame Steven Avery is soaking up his tax-payer-financed pension after committing the moral equivalent of murder in his public conduct and performance of public duties, as documented in Making a Murderer (Seasons One and Two) and the public criminal trial of innocents and post-conviction litigation.

Steven Avery and Brendan Dassey are victims, and Andrew Colborn is among the weak and miserable people capable of framing innocent men.

The critical mass of pathological entitlement, malice, and dehumanization is nurtured in the small-town, corrupt culture of the Manitowoc County Sheriff's Office and Calumet County Sheriff's Office and respective county district attorneys' offices that cultivate a Ken Kratz, a disgraced sex offender and special prosecutor who lied to obtain convictions against Avery and Dassey.

In December 2018, Colborn — likely becoming the subject of a criminal probe before this sordid affair is through — filed a defamation suit against against the Making a Murderer producers, Laura Ricciardi and Moira Demos, Netflix and others in Manitowoc County Wisconsin Circuit Court, (Andrew L. Colborn v. Netflix Inc., Chrome Media LLC, Laura Ricciardi, Moira Demos, Lisa Nishimura, Adam Del Deo, Mary Manhardt, and Synthesis Film LLC). [Summons and Complaint text is here.]

The case, as expected, was removed to federal court, United States District Court, Eastern District of Wisconsin, on April 4, (WBAY, Appleton Post-Crescent). The federal civil case is: Colborn v. Netflix Inc (1:19-cv-00484).

The rightwing Federalist Society-linked presiding Judge William C. Griesbach, brother of attorney Michael C. Griesbach who represents Colborn and is a former Manitowoc County prosecutor, recused on April 5.

The rightwing legal community in east-central is incestuous and adjudicates in an activist, results-oriented fashion.

U.S. Dist Judge Pamela Pepper was assigned as presiding judge on April 5 for all further court proceedings.

This is good news for the defendants and the First Amendment as the consensus on Judge Pepper is she is an intellectual jurist of high character, with no ties to the east-central Wisconsin corrupt legal community.

The conventional wisdom among court observers is Netflix, Inc, et al will make a motion to dismiss this Personal Injury - Assault, Libel, and Slander action this Spring or Summer.

Plaintiff Colborn's action accuses Netlix, Inc and other defendants of having "omitted, distorted, and falsified material and significant facts in an effort to portray Plaintiff [Andrew Colborn] as a corrupt police officer who planted evidence to frame an innocent man," (Appleton Post-Crescent).

According to Colborn's novel theory of libel law underlying his complaint, any public official performing his public duties, criticized at a public trial, now enjoys a basis for a civil action if journalistic and political speech criticizing the official's public conduct does not comport with a cop's, for instance, self-serving portrayal of his own public performance.

Add to Colborn's position in the defamation suit that Andrew Colborn was a candidate for Republican Party nominee for Manitowoc County Sheriff in 2006 just months after Oct 31, 2005 murder of Ms. Halbach. (Screen-shot of the Manitowoc Herald-Times, 2006, Reddit).

The public interest in ensuring the public integrity of police would appear to insulate journalists and political commentators from libel actions because of the protections in the First and Fourteenth Amendments, a judicial doctrine exemplified in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964).

Reached for comment, Howard Schweber, an expert in constitutional law, judicial politics, free speech, and democratic theory at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, acclaimed the prominence of the First Amendment.

"The [deputy] sheriff [Colborn] is certainly a public figure, and the subject of the statements involves his performance of his duties. That combination--a public official and a matter of public interest--entitles the defendants to the greatest possible level of First Amendment protection. As a result, I think this will be a difficult lawsuit to win, and any verdict in favor of the plaintiffs would certainly be appealed," said Schweber.

Colborn is of course faced with establishing "actual malice" from the creators and distributors of  Making a Murderer. Actual malice is defined here as the portrayal of Colborn with the knowledge that Colborn's public actions as reported in the documentary are false or, that the documentary portrayed Colborn with reckless disregard of the truth.

Since the rigorous sourcing of the documentary is derived mostly from the public trial transcript, Colborn's action seems desperate.

But there is more at stake in this case than the plight of another dopey cop from east-central Wisconsin.

Without a win for Netflix Inc., Chrome Media LLC, Laura Ricciardi, Moira Demos, Lisa Nishimura, Adam Del Deo, Mary Manhardt, and Synthesis Film LLC in this case, every corrupt cop could in principle bring civil actions against the protesting public for today's equivalent of seditious libel of government officials, should a federal appellate court adopt Colborn's ludicrous reading of the First Amendment and defamation.

Colborn's action like so much other action committed by law enforcement in east-central Wisconsin cannot stand under the light of examination.

As Justice Brennan, writing for an unanimous court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964), offered in defense of the liberty of the people against government miscreants and tyrants:
The First Amendment, said Judge Learned Hand,

presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues than through any kind of authoritative selection. To many, this is, and always will be, folly, but we have staked upon it our all. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F.Supp. 362, 372 (D.C.S.D.N.Y.1943).
Mr. Justice Brandeis, in his concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-376, gave the principle its classic formulation:
Those who won our independence believed . . . that public discussion is a political duty, and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government. They recognized the risks to which all human institutions are subject. But they knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies, and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones. Believing in the power of reason as applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law -- the argument of force in its worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed.
Thus, we consider this case [New York Times v. Sullivan] against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. (p. 270, New York Times v. Sullivan).

Yes.
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In the event the defendants' motion for a dismissal is not granted, Kathleen Zellner, Avery's post-conviction attorney uninvolved in the Colborn v Nettfix, Inc., sounded ecstatic on hearing news of the defamation action becasue law enforcement personnel will be forced to testify under oath.

Newsweek reported in December 2018:

Kathleen Zellner has called a recent lawsuit an 'early Christmas present' to her and the Making A Murderer team, though the filmmakers are the subject of the lawsuit. Former Officer Andrew Colborn is suing Netflix and Making A Murderer filmmakers Moira Demos and Laura Ricciardi for defamation, according to the lawsuit, filed Tuesday.

To Zellner, Avery’s current post-conviction attorney, the lawsuit is a gift. 'We are thrilled that Colborn filed this lawsuit [because] he will have to testify under oath about all of the issues that have swirled around him for years,' Zellner told Rolling Stone on Wednesday. 'Everything about the first wrongful conviction will be exhaustively explored as well. From having observed the meticulous, painstaking, uncompromisingly ethical work of Ricciardi and Demos for two-and-a-half years they have to be amused but not in the least threatened by this frivolous lawsuit. For us it is an early Christmas present.'

Colborn, who was an officer on the Steven Avery case featured in the series, claims the documentary series used a biased angle to wrongfully accuse Colborn and the Manitowoc County Police Department of planting evidence to convict Avery.

The lawsuit reads they 'omitted, distorted, and falsified material and significant facts in an effort to portray [Colborn] as a corrupt police officer who planted evidence to frame an innocent man. Defendants did so with actual malice and in order to make the film more profitable and more successful… sacrificing and defining [Colborn’s] character and reputation in the process.'

It also commented on the 'overwhelming guilt' of both Avery and his convicted nephew Brendan Dassey, as well as pieces of evidence featured in the series, which some claim were planted. Colborn then suggested had the filmmakers included more of his testimony at Avery’s trial, Avery’s guilt would have been overwhelmingly obvious.

Zellner disagrees. 'The basic theme of the complaint is flawed,' she told Rolling Stone. 'He is going to have to show that, but for these few edits, the world would have viewed Sgt. Colborn differently. … If the public wanted an un-edited version it could order the trial transcripts. Filmmaking is not stenography.'

Making a Murderer is speech —  certainly a vehement, caustic, and harsh attack on government and public officials — and though a pathological sense of entitlement appears to have gripped some units of Wisconsin law enforcement, the sovereign rights of citizens in our democracy to criticize their own government must prevail.

Jan 27, 2019

New Motion in Making a Murderer Case Implicates Wisconsin Law Enforcement

Manitowoc County Sheriff Dept Lt., Andrew Colborn, (Ret),
was implicated in misconduct in the second Steven Avery
frame-up, becoming a major disgraced public figure, as
documented in Making a Murderer, and Wrecking Crew,
Demolishing The Case Against Steven Avery
, (Ferak).
Numerous other Wisconsin law enforcement officials
have been implicated in criminal misconduct, uncharged
but not forgotten.

Framing innocents and conviction protection define Wisconsin 


Madison, Wisconsin — What do you call it when the police and prosecutors break the law to frame a man whom they know to be innocent?

Wisconsin, a state in which a disgraced ex-district attorney and sexual harasser Ken Kratz (who can longer practice law in Wisconsin) and his wife carry the public relations fight for wrongful convictions.

The Kratz are human garbage. After former attorney general Peg Lautenschlager passed away last year, Leah Kratz made jokes about her death on Twitter. The Kratz also support Donald Trump and assorted rightwing causes.

Manitowoc County is not Milwaukee, so Manty Co police do not kick the shit of a prone man for a traffic stop with the knowledge Mayor Tom Barrett is ready to support police misconduct, including murder, mayhem and beating a handcuffed man into convulsions and fracturing his face.

But Manitowoc and Calumet counties are cesspools of police corruption.

Police misconduct in Wisconsin's legal and political culture is like cold in Winter — it's the way it is, and human rights and social justice work are not going to change the cops or the weather, it is widely believed.

A motion filed Jan 24, 2019 by attorney Kathleen Zellner —  who represents the wrongfully convicted Steven Avery featured in the Making a Murderer docuseries —  seeks post-conviction relief because the Calumet County Sheriff's Office secretly and knowingly transferred evidence of a murder victim, Teresa Halbach, to private custody in 2011, in violation of state statutes that govern preservation of physical evidence collected, subject to criminal investigations.

Plot, evade, hide and deny everything is the motto of Wisconsin law enforcement, and Zellner's client, Avery, is another victim.

The new Avery motion was made in the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, District Two as part of a post-conviction strategy demonstrating violations of Avery 's Constitutional rights by multiple jurisdictions of Wisconsin law enforcement.

The post-conviction news draws national headlines.

From Kelly Wynne in Newsweek:

Bones that could have been tested for DNA in the case of Steven Avery have been returned to Teresa Halbach’s family, though it’s unclear if the bones were hers. Wrongful convictions attorney Kathleen Zellner filed a motion to have the bones tested in December, but that motion was quickly denied.

Zellner filed a second motion Thursday, which asserts the state violated Avery’s 14th amendment rights by denying DNA testing and failing to inform Avery’s prior legal council that the bones would be returned to Halbach’s family. The motion argues this amounts to an attempt by the state to 'destroy evidence' in the case.

The motion claims the bones were returned to the Halbach family in September 2011 at the Wieting Funeral Home by the Calumet County Sheriffs Department. 

As seen on Making A Murderer, the bones in question were found in the Manitawoc gravel pit, off of the Avery property. Much of Avery’s conviction was based on forensic evidence found on his property, according to the motion. Zellner explained if Halbach's bones were found in another location, it would negate the state’s arguments about how and where Halbach was killed, possibly clearing Avery’s name. The bones have never been tested for DNA.

The decision to give the bones to the Halbach family is in violation of Wisconsin’s 'preservation statute,' Zellner told Newsweek.

'We are very curious to hear the State’s explanation for violating the Wisconsin preservation statute,' she said. 'No notice was given to Avery or his attorneys at the time. The State claimed at trial there was no evidence the quarry bones were human, so why were they given back to the Halbachs? Giving the bones to the Halbachs confirms the State’s belief that not only were they human—they belonged to Teresa Halbach. The State cannot have it both ways. The destruction of material evidence is a serious constitutional violation.' 

The trial of Avery was a feast of lies and perjury committed by cops.

The Appleton Post-Crescent reports:
The attorneys argued that the appeal should be temporarily halted so the case can be sent back to the circuit court to determine if Avery's due process rights were violated. The motion came a little more than a week before a deadline for Avery's attorneys to file a brief before the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.

A spokesperson with the Wisconsin Department of Justice did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

According to Avery's attorneys, the state violated the law by failing to preserve certain suspected human bone evidence and failing to notify Avery and his attorneys of the state's intent to destroy it.

At trial, the state told the jury that all of the incriminating forensic evidence was in close proximity to Mr. Avery's residence and that bones found in his burn pit were the most important evidence against Avery, they wrote in the motion.

Jerome Buting, one of Avery's defense attorneys at trial, countered that bones found in the nearby Manitowoc County gravel pit were also important, but were glossed over by then-Calumet County District Attorney Ken Kratz because they didn't fit with the state's theory of Avery's guilt.

Kratz dismissed defense attorneys' claim that those bones were human, saying it had not been scientifically verified, Zellner and Richards wrote in their motion.

However, by giving the bones back to Halbach's family, the state implicitly admitted that they were human and belong to Halbach, they wrote.

The identification of the Manitowoc County Gravel Pit bone fragments as Ms. Halbach's is material because it is apparently exculpatory and potentially useful in proving the murder and mutilation did not occur in a location tied exclusively to Mr. Avery, Zellner and Richards wrote. No reasonable trier of fact could conclude that, if Mr. Avery murdered and mutilated Ms. Halbach in the Manitowoc County Gravel Pit, he would move her bones from the gravel pit to his own burn pit and thereby incriminate himself.

If this latest motion were filed before an unbiased and rational state appellate court, this would be an explosive development shaking the foundations of Wisconsin law enforcement.

In Wisconsin, however, the judiciary is corrupt and acts as little more than a shield for corrupt public officials in law enforcement in criminal law cases.

Reads Avery's motion in part, (with some links added):


STATE OF WISCONSIN, Plaintiff-Respondent, STEVEN A. AVERY, SR., Defendant-Appellant.

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S MOTION TO STAY APPEAL AND REMAND THE CAUSE FOR PROCEEDINGS ON CLAIMS FOR RELIEF IN CONNECTION WITH THE STATE'S VIOLATION OF WIS. STAT. § 968.205 AND YOUNGBLOOD V. ARIZONA

Defendant-Appellant, Steven A. Avery, Sr., ("Mr. Avery'') by his undersigned attorneys, Kathleen T. Zellner and Steven G. Richards, moves this Court to stay this appeal and remand the cause for a hearing on a claim for re ... [links added]

Supporters across the world look to Wisconsin with appropriate disgust.


The Constitutional violations are blatant; stay tuned.

To paraphrase Archibald Cox: Whether we shall continue to be a state of laws is now for ultimately the Wisconsin people to decide.

This would be easier if a handful of Wisconsin jurists acted in good faith.

Dec 21, 2018

Former Manitowoc Co Sheriff's Deputy Targets Free Speech in Defamation Suit — Attempt to Shield Corruption

Manitowoc County Sheriff Dept Lt., Andrew Colborn, (Ret),
was implicated in misconduct in the second Steven Avery
frame-up, becoming a major disgraced public figure, as
documented in Making a Murderer, and Wrecking Crew,
Demolishing The Case Against Steven Avery
, (Ferak).

Wisconsin Cops View with Suspicion and Hostility Public Criticism


Update: In July 2019, U.S. District Judge Pamela Pepper published a NOTICE of Hearing on pending motions set for December 19, 2019.

It appears likely Judge Pepper will dismiss Colborn's legal action, Colborn v. Netflix, Inc (1:19-cv-00484).

Just as likely, Colborn will appeal the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
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Madison, Wisconsin — The very liberties that animated the formation of our United States are under attack by those who betray and would destroy the great experiment of Constitutional democracy to hide malicious conduct in public office at local, provincial jurisdictions — Wisconsin cops and prosecutors.

A retired Manitowoc County Sheriff Dept Lt., Andrew Colborn, who helped frame Steven Avery is soaking up his tax-payer-financed pension after committing the moral equivalent of murder in his public conduct and performance of public duties, as documented in Making a Murderer, (Seasons One and Two) and the public criminal trial of innocents and post-conviction litigation, Steven Avery and Brendan Dassey.

There is not a statute indicating a specific crime for cops framing innocents like Avery and Dassey in the Wisconsin Criminal Code. There should be; the broad immunity cops enjoy is indecent.

Misconduct in public office and obstruction statutes often fall woefully short in implicating crooked cops and prosecutors. That's because the criminal justice system is wired, rigged, for cops and prosecutors to lie, cheat, and even kill the accused, or the deemed-unworthy and expendable.

But Andrew Colborn has just entered a realm with which he is both ignorant and hostile: First Amendment-protected speech, and privileged speech in libel law.

Colborn and his rightwing attorney, Michael C. Griesbach, have filed a defamation suit against against the Making a Murderer producers, Laura Ricciardi and Moira Demos, and Netflix in Manitowoc County Wisconsin Circuit Court, (Andrew L. Colborn v. Netflix Inc., Chrome Media LLC, Laura Ricciardi, Moira Demos, Lisa Nishimura, Adam Del Deo, Mary Manhardt, and Synthesis Film LLC). [Summons and Complaint text is here.]

Colborn, who retired in 2018, has taken a public posture in defending his Department's conduct since at least 2016 when Colborn sent a rambling communication through his Sheriff Dept's email account to USA TODAY Network-Wisconsin, (Dirr, USA Today, Jan, 2016; Sitzer, InTouch Weekly, Aug 2016).

Now, Colborn has retained a former Manitowoc County prosecutor, now in private practice, to file his defamation suit. [Summons and Complaint text is here.]

According to Colborn's novel theory of libel law underlying his complaint, any public official performing his public duties, criticized at a public trial, now enjoys a basis for a civil action if journalistic and political speech criticizing the official's public conduct does not comport with a cop's, for instance, self-serving portrayal of his public performance.

Steven Avery's attorney, Kathleen Zellner, like every other civil libertarian following the Avery case, does not hide her joy in Colborn's bumbling legal and public relations miscue.

From Rolling Stone:

'We are thrilled that Colborn filed this lawsuit [because] he will have to testify under oath about all of the issues that have swirled around him for years. Everything about the first wrongful conviction will be exhaustively explored as well. From having observed the meticulous, painstaking, uncompromisingly ethical work of Ricciardi and Demos for 2.5 years they have to be amused but not in the least threatened by this frivolous lawsuit. For us it is an early Christmas present.' ...

'The basic theme of the complaint is flawed,' Zellner, who is not named in the suit, tells Rolling Stone. '[Colborn] is going to have to show that, but for these few edits, the world would have viewed Sgt. Colborn differently. … If the public wanted an un-edited version it could order the trial transcripts. Filmmaking is not stenography.'
Colborn has one hell of a career to answer for under oath. Read Wrecking Crew, Demolishing The Case Against Steven Avery, (Ferak).

Maybe Donald Trump will chime in on the case to further Trump's view of sorts of American libel law.

American liberty is imperiled if Colborn's civil complaint were to succeed. Criticisms of municipal and county police conduct would be chilled, and the secrecy and power of the police and prosecutor over the citizenry would morph.

"History abundantly documents the tendency of Government -- however benevolent and benign its motive -- to view with suspicion those who most fervently dispute its policies," wrote Justice Powell for an unanimous United States Supreme Court striking down the Nixon administration's attempt to goad the Court to write out of existence Fourth Amendment and by implication in this case, First Amendment liberties, because administration ideologues hated the criticisms of the Peace Movement, the Civil Rights movements and burgeoning citizen movements of the 1960s-70s, (United States v. United States District Court (No. 70-153)). "[P]rivate dissent, no less than open public discourse, is essential to our free society."

That's true even if the object of criticism and ridicule are corrupt cops like Colborn.

Making a Murderer focused worldwide attention on the police-prosecutor-prison complex in east-central Wisconsin.

Will corrupt Wisconsin cops and allies use Colborn v. Netflix Inc to try to radically change the First Amendment?

Why wouldn't they? Attorney Kathleen Zellner is closing in, and in no other state than Wisconsin would a new trial already not have been ordered by the state judiciary.

Make no mistake, Colborn and his band of miscreants whether living on pensions or still working for Manitowoc County would take a defamation case and try to axe the First Amendment with every bit of enthusiasm they wielded in the crucifixions of Steven Avery, Brendan Dassey and other innocents unfortunate enough to reside in Manitowoc County.

Dec 18, 2018

Former Steven Avery Counsel Urges Open Discovery Process in Manitowoc Co's Deputy Sheriff's Defamation Suit

Corrupt Manitowoc County officials like Deputy Sheriff
Andrew Colborn are portrayed in Making a Murderer (1,2)
as a bumbling, dishonest and corrupt pieces of human
filth, as indicated in criminal legal filings. Colborn has
filed a civil suit, Colborn v. Netflix, Inc, et al
Madison, Wisconsin — Corrupt Manitowoc County officials like Deputy Sheriff Andrew Colborn are nervous.

They have cause to be desperate as attorney Kathleen Zellner closes in on not only exonerating her client, Steven Avery (and by logic Brendan Dassey), but also in a spectacle not seen in this medium, the docu-series: Implicating corrupt, crooked law enforcement in real time.

But desperate people like Colborn make mistakes, and Manitowoc County's Colborn just made a huge mistake: Colborn filed a defamation suit against the Making a Murderer producers, Laura Ricciardi and Moira Demos, and Netflix in Manitowoc County Wisconsin Circuit Court, (Andrew L. Colborn v. Netflix Inc., Chrome Media LLC, Laura Ricciardi, Moira Demos, Lisa Nishimura, Adam Del Deo, Mary Manhardt, and Synthesis Film LLC).

To game out a likely scenario: Even in corrupt Manitowoc County: Colborn's suit will be tossed with attorneys' fees paid to defendants.

However, if Colborn v. Netflix, Inc, et al survives a motion to dismiss, then Colborn's case can be used as a vehicle to gather information, sworn testimony, massive discovery of evidence of the Avery frame-up, as Zellner continues her post-conviction defense of Avery.

Deputy Andrew Colborn: Corrupt, malicious and stupid is no way to through life.

From Steven Avery's former co-counsel, Jerome Buting, featured in Making a Murderer: