Showing posts with label U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Show all posts
Showing posts with label U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Show all posts

Nov 10, 2022

Happy Veterans Day

Honor the fallen, fight for the living

On Veterans Day, 2022, thank you to our veterans, patriotic men and women, ours. 

I thank Robert Walsh of Battle Creek, Michigan, (U.S. Army, 101st Airborne Division, RVN 1971-72).

Bob Walsh is a brilliant, honor-bound attorney working out of Michigan, dedicated to veterans harmed by bureaucrats — often dishonorable denizens populating halls of government.

What is it that drives so many bureaucrats, polar opposites of veterans whom we salute? Those who shit their days away at the V.A. Office of Inspector General, for example, defaming and persecuting our people, our veterans, whom we should be respecting.

Bob Walsh never understood these people.

Bob shot me over quotes for a review of We Gotta Get Out of This Place - The Soundtrack of the Vietnam War, (University of Massachusetts Press, 2015).

Walsh talked about killing, war, brotherhood, loyalty and music the way most of us talk about college and love.

"I was in Vietnam late, 101st Airborne, C 2/502nd Infantry, Sgt., September 71-Janaury 72, infantry patrolling in the I Corps area. So no music except when we came back to Camp Eagle.

"Then I was at Qui Nhon in II Corps, with a security company. So music was around all the time. AFRTS (Armed Forces Radio and Television Service) (Good Morning, Vietnam) actually played some good stuff. The music was of the time and the time of the music. As the Vietnam War dragged on music made some of the strongest and most effective statements. Politics and events informed the art.

"By the way, I was against the Vietnam war (it was stupid) but it was the only war we had, and I volunteered to go when I did not have to. It was fun, it was real, but it was not real fun."
---

I last heard from Bob Walsh a few weeks back and Walsh was advocating for another veteran, now dead, screwed over by another VA bureaucrat and the U.S. Dept of Justice in Texas.

Justin Perez-Gorda died in federal custody pending trial in Feb 2022. Perez-Gorda is a combat veteran wounded in the Afghanistan War. He suffered a debilitating spinal injury, diagnosed and treated by numerous medical professionals, after being blown up by an IED in Afghanistan on January 5, 2011.

Perez-Gorda lived 33 years.

When he arrived at a federal facility after ridiculous fraud charges, his wheel chair was taken from him and thrown in a dumpster. He was denied clean catheters associated with his spinal condition.

Perez-Gorda died of Sepsis after 108 days in pre-trial custody, having been denied any meaningful and competent medical care.

He was guilty of nothing but raising his right hand and swearing to defend the Constitution.

The United States government then went after his widow, Josephine Casandra Perez-Gorda.

This year's White House Proclamation on Veterans Day, 2022 addresses women like Josephine Casandra Perez-Gorda, reading in part: "In respect and recognition of the contributions our veterans and their families, caregivers, and survivors have made to the cause of peace and freedom around the world, the Congress has provided (5 U.S.C. 6103(a)) that November 11 of each year shall be set aside as a legal public holiday to honor our Nation’s veterans."

This is no longer the case as the United States government targets not just veterans, but also caregivers.

Josephine Casandra Perez-Gorda elected not to testify at her trial. She was scared, angry and alone. The VA and DOJ said she is guilty of "overstating" the very spinal injury that led to her husband's death.

Said Bob Walsh, "In VA benefits fraud cases I am firmly convinced that it is essential for the defendant to testify. After all the evidence is in and as the last witness."

"The facts, medical, and expert evidence and testimony in this case were all overwhelming and in her favor. But the defendant failed to close the deal with the jury," concluded Walsh.

Josephine Casandra Perez-Gorda's (Josie) sentencing is scheduled for Dec. 20. Her Husband is dead, dishonored by lies, and she faces federal prison.

This prosecution was premature as the defendants were not afforded the administrative due process mandated by 38 CFR 42.1 by the VA, which is supposed to conduct a proper criminal investigation, and which would cleared both the husband and wife.

The VA Office of Inspector General provided their standard misleading and incomplete testimony to the federal grand jury. The local U.S. Attorney's office is often more than willing to carry out the bad work of VA bureaucrats.  

The widow, Josie, of Justin Perez-Gorda is now branded as a fraud and convicted felon.

Just another family destroyed by unlawful and shocking conduct of the VA Office of Inspector General. 

Since 1986 over 5,000 veterans and their families have suffered similar abuse, Bob Walsh said.

Happy Veterans Day, and to far too many: So sorry you were fucked over by the very country you defended.

Madness. A motion is pending before the Court, concluding: "The trial evidence actually showed that Josie believed that each of her statements were true at that time and place of the utterance; that Josie was reacting as a spouse/caregiver to Justin’s ongoing pain, permanent TBI mental condition, PTSD mental condition, and schizophrenia in each instance; and that Josie largely repeated words she had read in a VA decision or heard a doctor say."

The Dec. 20 sentencing hearing is before the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, San Antonio Division, United States of America.

Honorable United States District Judge Fred Biery is presiding.

Below is a reproduction of the motion for judicial acquittal in this case that is only now drawing national interest among the veterans' bar and veterans' advocates.

Motion for Judgement of Acquittal, Pursuant to Rule 29

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SAN ANTONIO DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.
JOSEPHINE PEREZ-GORDA, )
)
Defendant.

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL
PURSUANT TO RULE 29


CRIM. NO: SA-17-CR-845(2)-FB

TO THE HONORABLE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE FRED BIERY:

COMES NOW defendant Josephine Perez-Gorda by and through her undersigned counsel, filing this motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 29(c) and would show the Court as follows:

RULE 29
Rule 29(c)(2) provides that if a jury has returned a guilty verdict, the court may set aside the verdict and enter an acquittal. See F.R.Crim.P. 29(c)(2). A Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal “challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to convict.” United States v. Medina, 161 F.3d 867, 872 (5th Cir. 1998). The issue is “whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational [finder of fact] could have found the essential elements of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Boyd, 773 F.3d 637, 644 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); United States v. Miller, 588 F.3d 897, 907 (5th Cir. 2009)). “The standard does not require that the evidence exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or be wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt,
2
provided a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Loe, 262 F.3d 427, 432 (5th Cir. 2001). In this case, the evidence presented by the Government did not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Defense counsel originally began to present a detailed Rule 29 argument at the close of the Government’s evidence, but was cut short by the Court, who suggested a written motion, and the Rule 29 was denied. A defendant may renew such motion within 14 days after a guilty verdict. See F.R.Crim.P 29(c)(1). The court decides whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction. See F.R.Crim P. 29(a). In this case, the jury came back in approximately four or four and 1/2 hours, suggesting that the jury did not go through many of the approximate 100 defense exhibits presented. A subsequent Rule 29 motion at the end of the trial was also swiftly denied. The instant written Rule 29 motion, therefore, constitutes a renewed motion.
THE SECOND SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT
The Second Superseding Indictment, sought April 13, 2022 was brought within 2 ½ months after the death of Justin Perez-Gorda who was in prison undergoing a competency evaluation. It charged widow Josephine Perez-Gorda with devising a scheme with her soldier husband to defraud the Veteran’s Administration (VA) by overstating the severity and extent of Justin’s disability. The evidence showed Justin had been blown up by an IED in Afghanistan on January 5, 2011 and was operated on in theater. The trial further showed that Justin suffered from mental conditions including Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI), Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and Schizophrenia which plagued his recovery from his physical conditions of incomplete paraplegia and neurogenic bladder, among many others. Justin died in federal prison in late January 2022, alone and uncared for, from complications of using a catheter to relieve a neurogenic bladder
3
condition which the VA said Justin never had. (Def. Exh. 19-C)
The jury was instructed that Josie could become an agent for Justin, yet the VA, itself an agency, was never held responsible for the knowledge of its own employees.
Paragraph 5 of the Introduction to the Second Superseding Indictment stated “Participants in the Veterans Affairs Disability Compensation program receive medical examinations and rehabilitative services at Veterans Affairs facilities. Health care providers at these facilities rely on accurate and truthful reports from participants to determine a course of treatment and to confirm eligibility for various aspects of the health care services provided by the Veterans Administration.” Subjective words like these can never be proven beyond a reasonable doubt because patients can only tell doctors the truth as patients know it at that time and place. Of course, every injured American soldier also certainly has the corresponding right to expect his medical providers to competently review his medical record so that every patient visit to a VA employee does not become a version of a “Groundhog Day” movie.
As a matter of law, the VA’s own total and complete incompetence led to Justin’s faulty medical care, and ultimately, led to the second superseding indictment involving this severely injured soldier and his wife utilizing only certain particularly selected facts while completely ignoring the context surrounding those facts. The November 10, 2011 requested letter from Dr. Trbovich is but one example of the VA’s incompetence and this biased fact selection. On September 8, 2011, Justin participated with VA employee Karrie Reinecke in a driving test. The VA therefore knew that Justin could drive for short time periods since September 8, 2011. Karrie Reinecke’s note was transmitted to, and specifically immediately received by, VA employee Dr. Gary Campbell, Chief of Spinal Cord Injury, and became part of the permanent VA medical records for Justin (Def. Exh. 17-B, and p. 3). On June 14, 2011, a physical therapy note from VA
4
employee Denise Nance had stated that Justin could walk from the car inside a building from the handicap parking area. (Def. Exh. 15-S, p. 1, and p. 5). Nance made the choice,1 not to immediately copy anyone, but the record nonetheless became part of the permanent VA medical file for Justin.
These two VA records, among others, were therefore available to Dr. Michelle Trbovich on November 10, 2011, when she saw Justin as a patient for the first time. Had Dr. Michelle Trbovich bothered to take the time to review medical records prior to or during the appointment, she would have seen that Justin was driving short distances and walking short distances, but still needed a letter for car adaptive devices due to the fatigue factor noted by Reinecke. Therefore, the letter sought by Josie from Dr. Trbovich, with the requested words required by the VA, which Josie knew from two previous denials (Def, Exh. 6-C, Def. Exh.6-D), would certainly have made sense to a more conscientious, experienced, and prepared doctor. (Def Exh 18-D). Instead, we are here now.
The Alleged VA Scheme to Defraud
We turn now to the second superseding indictment. The Government set out approximately 15 paragraphs of acts which comprised the alleged VA scheme to defraud. The Counts in the Second Superseding Indictment that incorporated the alleged VA fraud scheme are Counts 1-4, Count 5, Count 6, Count 14, Count 15, Count 16, and Count 17. Each of the acts in the alleged VA fraud scheme were not proven by the Government beyond a reasonable doubt and cannot be the basis for conviction in this case.
Note 1 Testimony at trial indicated that VA employees would have to specifically decide to copy someone on their note that was placed in the VA record. VA Employees only did so when they felt that another VA employee should be immediately advised of the situation.
5
Paragraph One of the alleged VA Scheme to Defraud and Count 6 refer to the couple being granted a stipend pursuant to the Caregiver Support Program. On January 22, 2013, the medical record of Alisa Hartfield Cordero shows that she wrote down the phrase “permanent bilateral” which she testified that Josie said to her2 (Def. 12-A). Hartfield Cordero testified that she typed words down as they were said to her. Dr. Raymond Topp testified in the defense case, however, that “permanent bilateral,” without more, was a phrase that meant nothing. The evidence therefore showed that Josie was jumbling phrases that she had heard doctors say and had read in VA decisions: the words “permanent neurologic injury that makes it impossible to use his legs” were previously used by Dr. Raymond Topp on November 15, 2011 (Def. Exh. 5A) and the words “Pt now has permanent neurological injury of his bilateral lower extremities with loss of lower extremity strength precluding him from driving a car independently” were previously used by Dr. Michelle Trbovich on November 10, 2011 (Def. Exh. 18-D). Additionally, a January 18, 2012 rating decision stated, referring to Justin Perez-Gorda, “[t]his is the first time an examiner determine (sic) that you had permanent loss of use of your bilateral legs.” (Gov’t Exh. 1-H). The Government cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Josie made a false representation on January 22, 2013 because she uttered a meaningless phrase repeating what she had heard from doctors and VA raters. Under such circumstances, the Government also could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Josie acted willfully with bad purpose to disobey law or with a specific intent
Note 2 Josie also indicated that Justin had limited mobility, could not cook, could not dress himself, could not plan his daily activities due to his severe mental deficits of TBI and PTSD. This is Paragraph 7 of the Alleged VA scheme to defraud and also Count 14. The trial proved that these were all true statements at that time and place. Justin certainly had limited mobility due to pain; he would forget items on the stove due to TBI and PTSD; she would help him dress his legs; and she need to help him plan his daily activities due to TBI and PTSD. The couple was clearly admitted into the Caregiver Support program due to the TBI and PTSD mental health conditions. The Government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Josie’s statements at that time were actually false.
6
to defraud.
Furthermore, Josie’s utterances in this regard were not material. The testimony of Alisa Hartfield Cordero confirmed that an unidentified Department of Defense (DOD) doctor and Dr. Michelle Trbovich were involved in the decision to put the couple in the Caregiver Support Program at a particular Tier level.
3 The testimony showed that the unidentified DOD doctor and Dr. Michelle Trbovich relied on Justin’s medical records to place him in the program at the Tier 3 level. There was no evidence that the doctors materially relied on Josie’s garbled phraseology. Further, Dr. Michelle Trbovich testified that she had already decided in on November 10, 2011 that Justin did not need help with Activities of Daily Living.4 Accordingly, Trbovich was the only identified specific doctor involved in the decision to let the couple into the caregiver program. Trbovich had already evaluated Justin twice in person (Def. Exh, 18-E, Def. Exh. 18-H) by that time and also had previous VA records available to her indicating that Justin could drive and walk.
Obvious and utter incompetence by Dr. Trbovich and the unidentified DOD doctor with respect to the review of medical records resulting in a Tier 3 designation should not result in jail time for a patient or caregiver. As a matter of law, Josie’s words could not possibly have been, and certainly were not, proven to be material beyond a reasonable doubt to the Tier 3 decision
3 The evidence showed that Tier Levels were based on the amount of care needed for a patient. The highest amount of care needed resulted in a Tier 3 determination.
4 In fact, when the November 16, 2015 decision was made to kick the couple out of the Caregiver Support Program, the VA specifically referenced Michelle Trbovich’s November 10, 2011 note that Justin did not require help with his ADL’s. Justin was therefore clearly allowed into the program due to his mental TBI and PTSD deficiencies, but later removed from the program due to his alleged physical abilities which Trbovich had assessed four years ago on Justin’s first patient visit. In a nutshell, the absolutely proven incompetent, disjointed and incoherent care provided by the VA also contributes to the reasonable doubt in this case.
7
made by Dr. Michelle Trbovich and the unidentified DOD doctor5.
Of course, Josie’s statements to Alisa Hartfield Cordero regarding Justin’s mental deficiencies due to Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) were all true. Dr. Ouaou and Dr. Bigler, both presented in the defense case, made it clear that: 1) Justin suffered from a permanent TBI until the day he died, 2) that TBI and PTSD affected each and every one of his interactions with Josie and his medical providers, and 3) that his severe mental conditions affected both his activities of daily life and how he processed pain. The record reflected repeatedly that the couple was accepted into the caregiver program due to Justin’s mental condition (Def. Exh. 12-B, Def. Exh. 12-C). That much was abundantly clear. The trial evidence also showed that a person could be compensated at a Tier 3 level if he had a severe enough mental impairment. The Government’s evidence was therefore insufficient to prove this alleged paragraph of the VA scheme and Count 6 beyond a reasonable doubt.
Paragraph 2 of the alleged VA Scheme to Defraud refers to the traumatically brain injured Justin allegedly falsely reporting to a physician that his wife assisted him with 90 percent of ADLs on November 10, 2011. That physician was Dr Michelle Trbovich, the same person who immediately did not believe Justin, telling him at that time that it was untrue, and that he needed to do these things for himself. Trbovich essentially testified that sometimes spouses tried to do too much for their injured soldier, but ultimately the spouse help was not good for the veterans. Dr. Trbovich was a named decisionmaker for the Caregiver Support Program, who had
5 Had the Tier level been properly evaluated by Dr. Trbovich and the unidentified DOD doctor after a competent review of Justin’s medical records (and even the slightest memory by Trbovich of her two in person examinations), we wouldn’t be here. All of Josie’s actions as a caregiver would have been deemed appropriate by the VA, including her well-deserved vacations with her daughters.
8
immediately assessed Justin differently at the first November 10, 2011 appointment; therefore, Justin’s words regarding ADL’s on November 10, 2011 were never actually material in any way. Because Trbovich immediately discounted Justin, and the VA later used Trbovich’s own November 10, 2011 decision regarding ADLs to kick the couple out of the Caregiver Support Program on November 16, 2015, the Government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Justin’s words on November 10, 2011 were actually material to any decision at all.
Paragraph 3 of the alleged VA Scheme to Defraud refers to Justin’s application for Automobile Adaptive Equipment filled out by Justin on November 15, 2011. The defense proved that the words “permanent neurologic injury that makes it impossible to use his legs” were previously used by Dr. Raymond Topp on November 15, 2011 (Def.-Exh. 5A) and the words “Pt now has permanent neurological injury of his bilateral lower extremities with loss of lower extremity strength precluding him from driving a car independently” were previously used by Dr. Michelle Trbovich on November 10, 2011 (Def. Exh. 18-D). Accordingly, the traumatically brain injured Justin filled out that application for Automobile Adaptive Equipment using the words that he had heard from doctors. The Government cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Justin knew, at the time he filled out the application, that the words were false. Two doctors had already affirmed those words. Additionally, the testimony and records of VA employee Karrie Reinecke made clear that, due to fatigue at longer distances, Justin would need to use adaptive devices. (Def. Exh. 17-B). Paragraph 3 of the alleged VA Scheme to Defraud cannot be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of the alleged VA Scheme to Defraud refer to the traumatically brain injured Justin participating in a December 29, 2011 C&P exam. Dr. Sanders, who performed the
9
examination, testified that he did not remember Josie being there. The Government’s consistently misguided argument that a caregiver/spouse who appears at a medical appointment becomes fully responsible for what a patient says certainly did not apply to Dr. Sanders’ exam. There was no proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Josie was present at that exam.
Paragraph 8 of the alleged VA scheme to Defraud refers to the traumatically brain injured Justin telling a physician on March 11, 2013 that he walked around the home wearing braces and holding onto furniture and walls for support and requested a cane. (Gov’t Exh. 1-M). There was no proof presented at trial, that around that date and time, that Justin did not walk around the home that way. There was absolutely no proof that Justin made a false statement on March 11, 2013. The Government, either through testimony or exhibits, did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Justin did not do that when he was home. The evidence presented at trial was clear that Justin, day to day, was limited by pain and his TBI and PTSD mental conditions. The Government did not prove this paragraph of the alleged VA Scheme to Defraud beyond a reasonable doubt.
Paragraph 9 (same as Count 15) of the alleged VA Scheme to Defraud states that Justin and Josie told a physical therapist on April 10, 2013 that Justin could no longer walk and had not been walking since February of 2013. The April 10, 2013 encounter was recorded in a note. The note did not clearly indicate who spoke the alleged words (Def Exh. 15-W). The Government was also confused. Count 15 charged Josie, but states that “he” advised a physical therapist6. The evidence throughout the trial actually indicated that Justin’s mobility was indeed limited by pain as well as his TBI and PTSD. It was also clear from the evidence that the VA doctors expected
Note 6 Despite the prosecutor’s exhortations to the contrary, mere presence at a doctor’s appointment does not make one a co-conspirator or an aider and abetter.
10
patients to power through pain; that to the VA, pain did not actually affect walking—it only affected the will to walk. Of course, common sense indicates that people don’t express themselves that way; rather, people say they cannot walk due to pain.
In fact, the evidence overwhelmingly showed that the traumatically brain injured Justin was indeed limited by pain and did not want to (could not) walk. The statement that Justin “had not been” walking since February, 2013 was therefore a true statement, never proven false by the Government beyond a reasonable doubt. The paragraph also references a false display of strength. The same mental conditions that caused this soldier to put a gun to his wife’s head in 2012 and suffer subsequent involuntary commitment in a VA facility in October, 2014 show there is reasonable doubt whether to believe this injured soldier “falsely displayed” a level of strength during an exam in April, 2013. The Government also could not prove a “false display” of strength beyond a reasonable doubt because the evidence showed that Justin’s PTSD and TBI mental deficits caused him to be completely non-cooperative with medical providers. The Government therefore could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged “false display” was not actually an effect caused by Justin’s permanent TBI and PTSD mental deficits.
Paragraph 10 of the alleged VA Scheme to Defraud refers to Justin refusing to be seen by a Physician’s Assistant (Greg Morton) on September 3, 2015 (sic) and underperforming on a strength test. Paragraph 10 also says that that Josie coached Justin what to say. The medical record from September 2, 2015 stated “Veteran more alert and talkative than in the past couple of visits (over a year’s time period) He answered the questions or portions of the questions, where in the past, he would usually have his wife provide all but the basic interactions” (Gov’t Exh. 1-V, p. 10, 12). Furthermore, the same exhibit (Gov’t Exh. 1-V, p.10) completely contradicts the notion
11
that Josie was coaching Justin: “there were two episodes where the veteran did not directly agree with his wife but appeared uncomfortable with the information his wife provided.” This constitutes yet another example of the Government completely ignoring truthful context to attack a defendant. The word “coached” is nowhere to be found in the exhibit. Rather, the overall evidence showed that Josie was Justin’s best advocate helping her TBI and PTSD plagued soldier husband to navigate the VA. The Government cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Josie “coached” Justin what to say on September 2, 2015 or any other day.
Paragraph 11 of the alleged VA Scheme to Defraud refers to Justin falsely telling a VA Physician’s Assistant that he never walked. The 2014 medical record, omitted by the Government, was put in evidence (Def Exh. 6-AM), and the medical record does not contain a walking reference at all. The September 2, 2015 medical record in evidence (Def. Exh. 14-A) does contain a reference to Justin walking. The exhibit is co-authored by Morton and VA employee Denise Nance and their testimony was unclear as to who was told what by Justin. Review of Exh. 14-A is instructive: “Veteran declined to walk for therapist. No specific reason given…Only a generalized reason of he “did not care” to walk.” Also, “Veteran states he walks inside around the home. Wife clarified he walks more than room to room. Examples she provided were: Walking from the gas pump/parking lot into the convenience store, typically without difficulty or assistance.”7 The Government also never proved that the alleged references were ever transmitted to a decisionmaker, leaving the alleged statements incapable of being relied upon and lacking materiality. The Government cannot prove this paragraph of the alleged VA Scheme to Defraud
Note 7 An October 1, 2015 video (Gov’t Exh 9) merely confirmed Josie’s statement to the VA regarding the type of walking that Justin was doing.
12
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Paragraph 12 of the alleged VA Scheme to Defraud claims that on October 6, 2015, Josie falsely told a nurse in the VA’s Caregiver Support Program that her husband could walk “70 feet at most.” The medical note actually stated “Caregiver reports Veteran is able to ambulate about 70 feet but stops to sit down in the middle of the route” (Def. Exh. 8-L). There was no “at most” in the note. Since the word “route” was undefined, the statement captured by the medical note also actually implied that Justin could go another 70 feet after sitting down. The Government could not prove the “at most” part of this paragraph beyond a reasonable doubt.
Paragraph 13 of the alleged VA Scheme to Defraud states that on November 16, 2015, Justin falsely told a physician that the furthest he could walk unassisted was 50 feet by holding onto objects. The physician was Dr. Michelle Trbovich, who showed her tremendous bias by recording her medical note in a Question and Answer format (Def. Exh 18-AA). Review of that day’s complete medical record shows that Justin first tells Trbovich that his walking is only limited by pain, then tells her he can walk “as far as I want.”8 In that moment, Trbovich abandoned her doctor neutrality and, acting as an investigator for the OIG, goaded the traumatically brain injured and PTSD impaired Justin into the alleged statement in paragraph.13
Toward the end of the Q and A, and for good reason, Justin became suspicious of the doctor. A unbiased reading of the full Q and A by a fair and neutral court, shows that the Government cannot prove that the alleged statement was false beyond a reasonable doubt because
Note 8 At that point, the highly educated Trbovich certainly knew she had hurt the OIG investigation, so she decided to push the mentally impaired Justin into a corner, using the phrase “but I thought you said….” This was clearly no longer a neutral doctor trying to help a patient.
13
on that date, two conflicting statements were uttered just before the alleged false statement9. Additionally, the TBI and PTSD mentally impaired veteran was goaded into the statement by a doctor turned investigator. The Government unfairly and deceptively selected a statement out of the Q and A record for its second superseding indictment ignoring the clearly conflicting statements made just prior to the selected one. Under these circumstances, as a matter of law, the Government cannot prove that the selected utterance attributed to Justin was actually a false statement beyond a reasonable doubt.
Paragraph 14 (and Count 16) of the alleged VA Scheme to Defraud states that on November 16, 2015, Josie falsely told a program manager (Alisia Hartfield Cordero) that Justin had limited mobility, could not use his feet, and had permanent loss of the use of both feet. (Def Exh. 12-H). Of course, Hartfield Cordero had been told about Justin’s mental deficits and the mental deficits were the reason that the couple were admitted into the Caregiver Support Program. The meeting with Hartfield Cordero was 15 minutes long, according to the note. During closing argument, the prosecutor used the word “implied” when referencing Josie’s alleged statement for Count 16. An “implication” cannot ever prove an alleged representation beyond a reasonable doubt. Despite the fact that Ms. Cordero was careful to record what folks said to her (as she testified), the attributed statements were not in the note. Additionally, November 16, 2015 was the date that the couple was kicked out of the Caregiver Support Program based on Dr. Trbovich’s November 10, 2011 assessment of his physical abilities. At that point, on November 16, 2015, no one at the VA cared
Note 9 On the same date that Justin told Dr. Trbovich that he can walk as far as he wants (and is limited only by pain), the Government presented a video (Gov’t Exh. 10) proving Justin told the truth to Dr. Trbovich. The non-speculative portion of the completely biased neighbor testimony and the KENS-5 TV video also merely confirmed what the VA already knew, that Justin was walking a bit, driving short distances, and doing yard work (Def. 15AA).
14
what Josie and Justin said; the decision to remove Justin from VA care had been made. The Government also presented no evidence that the attributed statement was ever transmitted to any decisionmaker. Accordingly, the Government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged “implied” statement was relied upon by anyone, nor did the Government prove that the statement was material to any decision at all. Paragraph 15 refers to an amount received from the VA, but the Government made it clear to the Court and the jury that it was only seeking approximately $174,000 in VA “overpayment.” (Gov’t Exh 20).
For all of the reasons set forth above, the Counts which incorporated the alleged VA Scheme to Defraud (Counts 1-4, Count 5, Count 6, Count 14, Count 15, Count 16, and Count 17) should be dismissed with prejudice because the evidence was not sufficient to support a conviction.
The Alleged Social Security Scheme to Defraud
The Social Security Scheme to Defraud sets out 12 paragraphs of alleged acts which must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The alleged Social Security Scheme to Defraud is incorporated into Counts 7-13 and Count 18. Paragraph 9 of the alleged Social Security Scheme to Defraud (page 18 of the superseding indictment) links and incorporates all of the paragraphs of the VA Scheme to Defraud, so the failure to prove the VA Scheme to Defraud beyond a reasonable doubt also means that the alleged Social Security Scheme to Defraud also cannot be proven by the requisite standard.
The Government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Justin was able to work
Paragraph 1 of the alleged Social Security Scheme to Defraud states that Justin and Josie falsely represented to Social Security that Justin’s injuries led to conditions that left him unable to work. Testimony revealed that Social Security benefits are provided when someone is unable to
15
work. The trial showed that, after he was blown up in Afghanistan, Justin was not able to work due to his permanent TBI, PTSD, and schizophrenia. This was a soldier who held a gun to his wife’s head in August, 2012, was involuntarily committed to a psychiatric hospital in October, 2014, and went to jail in May, 2017 due to his serious and permanent TBI and other mental conditions. These mental conditions affected every area of his life and affected his recovery from incomplete paraplegia and neurogenic bladder. Justin dealt with these physical and mental conditions throughout his short life.
The trial also showed, as a matter of law, that Justin and his family were always entitled to Social Security benefits during the requisite time period. Trial testimony from Dr. Ouaou, Dr. Bigler, and Dr. Wilson indicated that Justin’s TBI, PTSD, and Schizophrenia affected each and every one of his interactions including those with Josie, his medical providers, and the general public. The trial testimony showed Justin’s bizarre behavior such as driving erratically and repeatedly escalating small conflicts into bigger ones. The VA had Justin 70 percent rated for TBI and PTSD due to, among other things “difficulty in establishing and maintaining effective work and social relationships.” (Gov’t Exh. 1-K); (Gov’t Exh. 18). Quite simply, the Government did not, and could not as a matter of law, show beyond a reasonable doubt that Justin was ever able to work during the time period of the Superseding Indictment.
The Government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged statements were actually declarative representations or actually material to the decision.
Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the alleged Social Security Scheme to Defraud state that on March 19, 2012, and March 30, 2012, Josie made a number of false statements on particular forms (Def Exh. 2-A), (Gov’t Exh. 2-B). Though the Social Security forms requested information about how a person’s injuries “affect” whether that person can do certain things, the Government did not use
16
the word “affect” in its second superseding indictment, deceptively phrasing Josie’s “claims” as declarative statements. The forms invited checked boxes, but Josie also included partial phrases on the form. Josie included TBI and PTSD as part of her description of her soldier.
Paragraph 6 of the alleged Social Security Scheme to Defraud falsely states that its determination was based on statements made by Josie. The Government did not call a Social Security decisionmaker to the stand. Rather, the Government called only one witness, Kim Belknap with respect to the Social Security counts. Witness Belknap testified that the applications were merely a starting point, even for a simple thing like onset date of injury. She testified that disability medical examiners scoured the records to determine whether someone was actually entitled to benefits and when those benefits would start. According to Belknap, the onset dates and other information in the application merely allowed examiners to focus their inquiry.
The Government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that any of Josie’s alleged checked boxes and partial phrases on the March 19, 2012 or March 30, 2012 applications were actually transmitted to, were actually relied upon by, or were actually material to, a Social Security decisionmaker reviewing Justin’s file. The failure to call an actual Social Security decisionmaker meant that materiality was not, and could not, be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The Counts which incorporated the alleged Social Security Scheme (Counts 7-13 and Count 18) should be dismissed with prejudice because the evidence was not sufficient to support a conviction.
The Government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Josie acted willfully or with the specific intent to defraud.
Furthermore, the Government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Josie did anything willfully or with a specific intent to defraud. The trial proved that pain, TBI, and PTSD affected Justin on any given day and limited his mobility. The evidence also showed that caregiver
17
Josie was required to react to Justin’s moods and difficulties with medical providers on any given day. Acting willfully is to do something with bad purpose to disobey or disregard the law (Counts 6, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18). Specific intent to defraud is a conscious knowing intent to deceive or cheat someone (Counts 1-4, 5, 7-13). Navigating the VA’s disjointed system of care with a severe permanent TBI and PTSD mental health conditions along with debilitating physical conditions meant that Justin needed his wife to be his advocate. The testimonial evidence from Dr. Dersh. Alice Canion, and others indicated that Justin needed Josie’s help to communicate with and understand his medical providers.
The trial evidence actually showed that Josie believed that each of her statements were true at that time and place of the utterance; that Josie was reacting as a spouse/caregiver to Justin’s ongoing pain, permanent TBI mental condition, PTSD mental condition, and schizophrenia in each instance; and that Josie largely repeated words she had read in a VA decision or heard a doctor say. The record also indicates that she was just trying to help Justin communicate with his doctors to help him get better. Testimony and evidence presented at trial revealed that Josie was encouraging Justin to go to his medical appointments, but Justin did not want to go. The VA, largely ignoring Justin’s mental conditions, was unbending in working with Justin and Josie to get Justin care. Because the evidence showed that she was a caring spectator to Justin’s myriad mental and physical conditions, the Government could not legitimately prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Josie acted with a specific intent to defraud or acted willfully with bad purpose to disobey the law.
18
The Government misled the Court and the jury with its argument that Josie stood by and did not correct Justin during medical provider appointments.
The Government’s argument during the abbreviated Rule 29 at the close of the Government’s case and the Government’s argument to the jury included the fact that Josie attended medical provider appointments but did ever not contradict the mentally impaired Justin when he spoke about his capability to walk. This misguided argument which misled the Court and the jury was not factually correct. The evidence showed that Josie did tell either VA employee Nance or VA employee Morton that Justin walked further than he said he did on September 2, 2015 (Def Exh. 14-A). The Government’s misleading argument to the Court and the jury that a caregiver spouse must be vigilant to correct a patient at a medical provider’s appointment was erroneous, constituted a misstatement of the law, and ultimately led the jury down the wrong path.
The fact that Josie attended many of her husband’s medical appointments was not adequate proof of conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt. The Government therefore did not prove any agreement between Justin and Josie beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial evidence from Dr. Ouaou, Dr. Bigler, and Dr. Wilson that Justin’s TBI, PTSD, and Schizophrenia affected each and every one of his interactions with Josie and his medical providers, coupled with Justin’s acts of violence toward Josie (gun to head in 2012, involuntary commitment in 2014, and domestic dispute in 2017) make it clear that an agreement (conspiracy) to commit health care fraud could not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
While a jury can be fooled by a prosecutor’s argument with respect to a spouse attending medical appointments, a court should not be. “Mere presence at the scene of an event, even with knowledge that a crime is being committed, or the mere fact that certain persons may have associated with each other and may have assembled together and discussed common aims and
19
interests, does not necessarily establish proof of the existence of a conspiracy. A person who has no knowledge of a conspiracy, but who happens to act in a way that advances some purpose of a conspiracy, does not thereby become a conspirator.” “Before any defendant may be held criminally responsible for the acts of others, it is necessary that the accused deliberately associate himself or herself in some way with the crime and participate in it with the intent to bring about the crime. Mere presence at the scene of a crime and knowledge that a crime is being committed are not sufficient to establish that a defendant either directed or aided and abetted the crime unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was a participant and not merely a knowing spectator.” The Government’s evidence in this regard was just not sufficient to sustain a conspiracy or aiding and abetting conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.
In conclusion, the Government did not prove the alleged VA Scheme to Defraud beyond a reasonable doubt. The Government did not prove the alleged Social Security Scheme to Defraud beyond a reasonable doubt. All of the Counts in the Second Superseding Indictment incorporated one of the alleged Schemes to Defraud. A rational trier of fact could not find that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on any Count. Accordingly, a judgment of acquittal should be entered for all counts in the Second Superseding Indictment.
Respectfully submitted
__________/s/_________
THOMAS P. MOORE
Attorney at Law
Texas State Bar No. 14378320
800 Dolorosa, Suite 206
San Antonio, Texas 78207

Aug 26, 2022

George Laughton Claxton: Infantry, Mr. Agent Orange, Badass Veterans' Advocate, Passes Away

George Laughton Claxton
Walled Lake, Michigan
April 4, 1943 - August 22, 2022

Update: Veterans are seeking Claxton's Agent Orange papers to move them to The Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive at
Texas Tech.

In veterans' advocacy, there are pretenders.

And there are badasses — determined souls who never give up.

George Claxton was a badass. He passed away on August 22, 2022.

Before the effort George Claxton launched, no veterans or families of veterans exposed to herbicide or chemicals in the Vietnam invasion received any relief for Agent Orange, Dioxin,

As a Vietnam veteran remarked, "After George's litigation, Vietnam Veterans of America’s National Agent Orange/Dioxin Committee, was completed some veterans and some families got some relief.  Considering that he was opposed by the chemical industry, the DoD and the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs VA that was no small victory." That's Bob Walsh, Vietnam veteran and fellow veterans' advocate.

George Claxton started the effort that has recently resulted in the opening of the Camp Lejeune water litigation and the PACT Act.

OBITUARY GEORGE CLAXTON

George (DH) Claxton died Monday August 22, 2022 after a lengthy illness.

George was born April 4, 1943 to Pastor John Claxton who preceded him in death. He served his country from 1965-1970.

He served a two year tour of duty in Vietnam with the 25th Infantry Division (TROPIC LIGHTENING).

He was truly a veterans advocate with particular emphasis on veterans exposed to herbicides in Vietnam. He served for 10 years as State Service Director for Vietnam Veterans of America while serving as Chairman of VVAs National Agent Orange/Dioxin Committee.
 

He was the second individual plaintiff (in 1983) in the class action suit (MDL-381) pitting Vietnam veterans against the seven (7) chemical companies who manufactured the herbicides and insecticides used in Vietnam. 

His filing (Claxton vs Dow Chemical et al.) was 163 pages long.

In the suit against the VA (Nehmer v. Veterans Administration) he was one of ten plaintiffs who, when the case was decided by Judge Henderson in May 1989, was the beneficiary of the decision that forced the VA to reformulate its Agent Orange adjudication rules.

Within the veteran community, George Claxton was known admirably as Mr. Agent Orange. As far back as 1985, he was boring people to tears with his "million dollar words" Claxton was instrumental in the programming of a cable television show about Agent Orange that aired for over 4 years in Grand Rapids, Michigan.

He also appeared on focused programming on Channels 2 and 50 in Detroit and Channel 6 in Lansing, Michigan relative to the subject of Agent Orange and tort claims arising out of exposure in Vietnam.

He also has been the subject of, or has guest-authored articles about this issue in THE DETROIT FREE PRESS, THE LANSING STATE JOURNAL, and USA TODAY. George had the guts to go into prisons and do claims work with incarcerated veterans "long before it was cool to work with incarcerated veterans."

He fought with both the Michigan Department of Corrections and the Veterans’ Administration medical centers in the state over the issue of getting incarcerated veterans transported to the medical centers from the prisons.

Having won that battle, George tackled the problem of prison guards wearing weapons inside the medical center while escorting incarcerated veterans. That was also a win. George discovered barrels of Agent Orange from Dow chemical were stored at the Michigan State Prison in Jackson. This was exposing all inmates and staff as well as re-exposing Vietnam veterans.

He went to the Department of Corrections, no response. He tried to get the 3 television networks to expose the situation. This was a dead end.

Finally, he convinced the DETROIT NEWS to cover the issue. It was a small article toward the back. It was rumored to be the only way the editorial staff could be rid of him.

There was a rally, organized by George, to establish a Michigan Agent Orange Commission.

There were several prominent toxic exposure speakers and a shopping cart filled with oranges labelled dioxin on the Capital steps. The State legislature authorized the Michigan Agent Orange Commission and appointed George as a member.

The commission contracted for a research study of Vietnam veterans, with various jobs in Vietnam, for body burden of the toxins sprayed in Vietnam.

The results proved all "in country" personnel were exposed to the toxins.

Rumor has it that a high school student contacted George for assistance in researching a term paper on Agent Orange. Two days later George gave the student a 25-page paper complete with references and bibliography. The result was nearly a thesis retyped, without typing errors, which the student submitted.

After Vietnam, George increased his education. 1973 Bachelor of Science (with honors) Northern Michigan University. Attended Cooley Law School 1974-1975 and 1978-1980. George authored the MICHIGAN PHYSICANS GUIDE ON AGENT ORANGE.

He participated in "First Citizens Conference on Dioxin" Twice he returned to Vietnam to participate on the "Symposium on Herbicides in War" His peers characterize him as someone who for 30 years plus, gave of himself, 24 hours a day, 7 days each week for something in which he firmly believed and to which he totally committed.

During his retirement due to illness, George would be sitting at his computer searching for research reports on toxins. He assisted attorneys building the brief with the latest research results. If not at his desk, he was traveling at his own expense to educate veteran families concerning the health effects of toxins. He was deeply concerned about the birth defects associated with a parent’s exposure to toxins.

When told President Obama had signed the CHILDREN OF VETERANS TOXIC RESEARCH LAW, he replied, yes we got it. George Claxton was a lifetime member of: Vietnam Veterans of America, Veterans of Foreign Wars, Disabled American Veterans, American Legion, and AMVETS. Unfortunately, George’s health preventing him from understanding that President Biden signed the PACT Law on August 10, 2022.

The provisions of the law are what George worked toward his entire adult life.

May 31, 2021

Dead Veterans and Chickenhawks

Robert Walsh: Attorney, veteran, and "combat infantryman
in Vietnam with the fabled 101st Airborne Division," 
fights, for veterans, reports the Toledo Blade.

Joe Biden budget for the War Dept is larger than Trump's.

Chickenhawk Joe is selling out hard.

Veterans and all of us will get the shaft.

"After George W. Bush was elected president and started the Iraq War, (attorney) Robert Walsh said, 'Karl Rove and Dick Cheney declared war on PTSD. They wanted to deny there was any such thing," reports Jack Lessenberry in the Toledo Blade and Lessenberry Link.

The war against veterans who filed for PTSD disability generated a lot of casualties, notes Walsh elsewhere, guys who froze "to death on the streets or blow their brains out in the garage."

Reading journalist Lessenberry's work on Robert Walsh, veterans and the VA bureaucrats who hate them is needed tonic as the DoD budget keeps rising, and veterans keep dying.

Happy Memorial Day.

Apr 27, 2021

Toledo Blade Column Recalls Story of Wrongfully Convicted Wisconsin Vietnam Veteran — Keith Roberts

Robert Walsh: Attorney, veteran, and "combat infantryman
in Vietnam with the fabled 101st Airborne Division," 
fights, for veterans, reports the Toledo Blade.
"After George W. Bush was elected president and started the Iraq War, (attorney) Robert Walsh said, 'Karl Rove and Dick Cheney declared war on PTSD. They wanted to deny there was any such thing," reports Jack Lessenberry in the Toledo Blade and Lessenberry Link.

The war against veterans who filed for PTSD disability generated a lot of casualties, notes Walsh elsewhere, guys who froze "to death on the streets or blow their brains out in the garage."

Reading journalist Lessenberry's work on Robert Walsh, veterans and the VA bureaucrats who hate them is needed tonic as the DoD budget keeps rising, and veterans keep dying.

Nov 10, 2019

Veterans Day 2019 — Wisconsin Navy Veteran Proven Innocent; But Not Yet Cleared of Wrongful Conviction

Wisconsin's Keith Roberts
is a veteran whom we
betrayed and is a man
who will never be made
whole by what baleful
U.S. officials acting from
base motives inflicted
on an innocent man
from northern Wisconsin.

First in a series this week on wrongful conviction of innocent veteran


Updated - Madison, Wisconsin — Decency and duty drove a Wisconsin Navy veteran to act in an unsuccessful attempt to save a fellow airman from being crushed to death by a 73,000-pound C-54 transport aircraft at a Naval airbase in Naples, Italy on Feb 4, 1969.

The Navy veteran is Keith Roberts of Gillett, Wisconsin, (Mal Contends).

For his service and good work, Roberts was prosecuted by the United States Dept of Justice in one of the most despicable miscarriages of justice my state has seen.

While Roberts filed a disability claim related to his PTSD condition, citing in-service 'stressors,' that was being adjudicated at the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA), U.S. Attorney Steven Biskupic (2001-2009) stepped in and subsequently secured an indictment on mail fraud on April 26, 2005 under Title 18 United States Code 1341 (mail fraud), later superseded to wire fraud, (Wisconsin State Journal).

Roberts was convicted of wire fraud in 2007 for receiving disability benefits related to PTSD, diagnosed by several public and private medical professionals. The federal indictment was malicious and baseless, (Wisconsin Navy Airman Keith Roberts, U.S. Attorneys Scandal–Milwaukee, EpluribusMedia, Wis Community).

The indictment reads in part that Roberts was not friends with his friend, Airman Gary Holland, and that Roberts "exaggerated" efforts to save his friend when the Navy air base equivalent of a general quarters alarm was sounding as an air man was being crushed to death by the C-54 aircraft. Consider this.

Reads a U.S. Department of Justice, United States Attorney’s Office Eastern District of Wisconsin press release from March 5, 2007:

Roberts was an airman stationed at the Naval Air Facility in Naples, Italy, in 1969. The indictment alleged,and the government proved at trial, that Roberts fabricated his role in the attempted rescue of an airman who was killed at the Naval Air Facility on February 4, 1969. Roberts also fabricated his relationship with that airman.Roberts was discharged from active duty in 1971.
The DoJ indictment is demonstrably false, but even granted its silly assertions and premises is absurd grounds for a federal criminal indictment.

This Wisconsin veteran's fight for exoneration of this political prosecution continues on this Veterans Day, 2019.

Contra the government's case, writes human rights attorney Scott Horton in Harper's Magazine (Sept 7, 2007), "The prosecution smacks of retaliation and a plan to suppress veterans claims—Roberts was prosecuted for tenaciously pursuing a claim for benefits, which VA resisted and which is still in the benefits review process."

The Vietnam-era veteran had no idea while he was gathering evidence seeking an earlier retroactive date for his successful VA claim in 2002, per the advice of a Shawano (Wisconsin) Veteran’s Service Officer, and jumping through hoop after hoop, that not only were his existing VA benefits in jeopardy but his very liberty was in danger.

"The process of gathering evidence to prove PTSD disability is extremely time-consuming," said then Sen. Barrack Obama (D-IL) on August 10, 2005 at a time when the VA was set to review 72,000 PTSD cases, but backed down under intense pressure from veterans. "It requires the compilation of medical records, military service records, and testimonies from other veterans who can attest to a person’s combat exposure."

As Roberts was adjudicating his claim with the VA, after Roberts had accused the VA of fraudulently handling his claims in 2003, U.S. Atty Biskupic, in an extraordinary development, stepped in in 2005 and launched this extraordinary prosecution.

Critics see Roberts as an innocent victim—a poster boy and cautionary tale—of a VA bureaucracy determined to deter PTSD claims from Vietnam vets, rightwing forces allied with VA Secretary Jim Nicholson (2005-07), and an overzealous prosecutor, Biskupic and his staff.

This week, these pages will feature exclusively new developments of a man who served our country honorably; followed the advice of his veteran service officer, and was subsequently chewed up, imprisoned and effectively tortured in federal prison.

A three-member panel for the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (07-1546) in July 2008 found that, "The record might also have supported a jury determination that Mr. Roberts sincerely believed that his statements were true and that he had no intention to defraud the Government ... .
---
The U.S. v. Keith A. Roberts indictment on mail fraud (April 26, 2005), [superseded by the indictment on wire fraud,] alleges in part that Roberts in his "(s)cheme to (d)efraud" the VA "falsely represented material information to the VA" including "that Roberts and airman Gary (Holland) were close friends and roommates."

In fact, an analysis obtained from Roberts' wife, Deloris Roberts, of the service histories of Gary Holland and Keith Roberts reveals parallel military careers that would make it unlikely that Holland and Roberts were not at least friendly in their relationship, and that contradicts the prosecution’s indictment and trial statements.

These service histories are readily available to any federal investigator probing the case. But the enterprise of judging the friendship between two airmen 35 years later is the basis of a federal indictment?
--
In February 2010, U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts questioned Assistant to the Solicitor General Anthony Yang in oral arguments in the federal benefits-related case, Astrue v. Ratliff.

Asked Justice Roberts, "In litigating with veterans, the government more often than not takes a position that is substantially unjustified?" (p. 52, United States Supreme Court)

Yes, he was told.

Roberts found this "really startling."

So, please, stay tuned, what I will present in these pages this week is really startling.

And Happy Veterans Day, Keith Roberts.

We know what our government did to you and your family.

"[T]he only reason Airman Roberts was ever prosecuted was because he was a ‘belligerent ass’ who kept insisting that he get paid back to discharge. He was demanding an appeal in Washington," said the source at the Clement J. Zablocki VA Medical Center in Milwaukee who e-mailed the Lee Rayburn radio show in Madison in early June 2007 about the Roberts affair. "I'd have to say that you guys are TOTALLY (uppercase in the original) right about Roberts' conviction being bullshit ... . "

See also:

Jul 3, 2017

Let justice be done though the heavens should fall

 Navy veteran Keith Roberts
served during Vietnam War era

Veteran waits for justice and respect


Republicans remain committed to gutting veterans' benefits, forgetting we own the medical care of those charged with defending our country.

The unofficial animus against veterans persists, too many Democrats are afraid to do anything that might upset someone, somewhere.

"A man, [sic], who is good enough to shed his blood for his country is good enough to be given a square deal afterwards. More than that no man is entitled, and less than that no man shall have," said President Theodore Roosevelt in a speech to veterans in Springfield, Illinois, July 4, 1903.

Roosevelt is dead and veterans are a prop for politicians during holidays.

Wisconsin's Keith Roberts, a Navy veteran who served during the Vietnam War combat era, believed he could apply for disability benefits after he was honorably discharged. Roberts tenaciously pursued his claim for his diagnoed PTSD, (Harper’s Magazine).

A huge mistake. As the Bush-Cheney adminstration launched its invasion of Iraq, the chicken-hawk administration set its sights on veterans as well: No mass PTSD applications, especially Vietnam War vets, and the weight of the United States government was threatened against veterans who were being branded as criminals, (Washington Post).

Roberts was subsequently railroaded by the VA and United States Attorney Steven Biskupic, (2001-2009), in a case that remains nothing less than indecent.

The crux of the federal criminal case against Roberts is that Roberts was not friends with his fellow Navy airman, (Gary Holland), when both the men were on line duty at a Naval base in Naples, Italy on February 5, 1969 and Holland was crushed to death by a C-54 aircraft in a horrific accident.

The prosecution said Roberts exaggerated his efforts to save Holland, which constituted federal wire fraud for which Roberts was convicted by a jury in northern Wisconsin. Roberts also lied about his "friendship," reads this bullshit prosecution.

Holland and Roberts did not have a friendship, and Roberts exaggerated his efforts to save Holland. That’s the alleged fraud, that’s the intent to engage in fraud? On its face the prsocution's case is ridicluous, but good enough for a conviction in federal court.

In fact, the two men had parallel service histories that would make it unlikely that Holland and Roberts were not at least friendly in their relationship, and this fact alone falsifies the prosecution’s indictment and trial statements.

So what happened, why the prosecution on such a slender reed?

"[T]he only reason Airman Roberts was ever prosecuted was because he was a ‘belligerent ass’ who kept insisting that he get paid back to discharge. He was demanding an appeal in Washington," said a background source at the Clement J. Zablocki VA Medical Center in Milwaukee who e-mailed the Lee Rayburn radio show in Madison in early June 2007 after a program about the Roberts case, and asked to remain anonymous out of fear of losing his job. "I'd have to say that you guys are TOTALLY (uppercase in the original) right about Roberts' conviction being bullshit ... ."

Said Roberts’ attorney Robert Walsh, a combat Vietnam Army veteran, at the oral arguments in October 2007 before the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, referencing this VA standard for judging any first-person account by veterans of what happened to them during their service:

… I submit to you that they are inconsistencies in every veteran's record, combat or peacetime. And that Congress has recognized that. And that’s why VA benefits is a very paternalistic, claimant-friendly, non-adversarial system. It’s even more paternalistic that the Social Security benefits adjudication system (per the Veterans Judicial Review Act). So, where’s the intent (for fraud)?
After serving years in federal prison on a ludicrous conviction, Roberts continues today to battle the VA, a mean-spirited adversary.

Happy Independence Day. But for many, for Keith Roberts, Independence Day is a fraud.

Attorney Robert Walsh's brief filed last week with the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims argues for respect finally for a Navy veteran betrayed by the country he served.

The text of the brief is reproduced below:


UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR
VETERANS CLAIMS
KEITH A. ROBERTS,
Appellant,
v.
DAVID J. SHULKIN, M.D., Secretary of Veterans Affairs,
Appellee.
Appeal from the Board of Veterans’ Appeals
in Docket 03-04 265, Michael E. Kilcoyne, Veterans Law Judge
and
Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
in Docket 05-2425, 23 Vet.App. 416, April 23, 2010,
Chief Judge William P. Greene, Jr.
FIRST AMENDED OPENING BRIEF
OF APPELLANT KEITH A. ROBERTS
Robert P. Walsh, Esq.
Two West Michigan Avenue
Suite 301
Battle Creek, Michigan 49017-7002
Telephone (269) 962-9693
Facsimile (269) 962-9592
E-mail: rpwalsh@sbcglobal.net
Attorney for Claimant-Appellant

1. TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
1. TABLE OF CONTENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
2. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
3. TABLE OF RBA CITATIONS.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
4. CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC FILING. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii
5. FIRST AMENDED OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
6. INTRODUCTION.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
7. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9. STANDARD FOR REVIEW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
10. STATEMENT OF THE CASE.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
I. Course of Proceedings Below . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
A. Board remand Order of September 28, 2012, implementation of the
Courts remand. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
B. Adjudication of the post-severance PTSD claim. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
II. Statement of the Facts Relevant to the Issues .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
11. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
I. WHETHER THE SECRETARY FAILED TO COMPLY WITH
THE ORDER OF THIS COURT IN ROBERTS V. SHINSEKI,
23 VET.APP 416, DATED APRIL 23, 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16
A. The Board failed to comply with 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1)
when it did not adequately state the reasons or bases for
denying reopening the claim for service connection for
post traumatic stress disorder based upon new and
material evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
II. THE SECRETARY HAS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH
THE CONGRESSIONALLY MANDATED DUE PROCESS
PROTECTIONS REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF BENEFITS
FRAUD FOUND IN HIS OWN REGULATIONS, 38 C.F.R.
§§ 42.1-42.47, IMPLEMENTING THE PROGRAM FRAUD
CIVIL REMEDIES ACT OF 1986, AND THUS DEPRIVED
THE APPELLANT AND HIS FAMILY OF DUE PROCESS
OF LAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS, Cont’d.
Page
III. THE BOARD ERRED WHEN IT ENDORSED VIOLATIONS
BY THE SECRETARY OF THE FIFTH AND SIXTH
AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
RESULTING IN THE UNLAWFUL DEPRIVATION OF THE
LIBERTY AND PROPERTY OF THE APPELLANT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
A. Free Standing Constitutional Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
B. The regulations found in 38 C.F.R.§ 14.561 and
§§ 42.1-42.47 must be followed in order to comply
with the due process requirements of the Administrative
Procedures Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .22
C. The $150,000.00 limit found in the PFCRA is not
applicable in this case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23
D. Employees of the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs
cannot adjudicate benefits fraud allegations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23
E. The agency Office of General Counsel failed to
meet its obligations to the Appellant as the
reviewing official under 38 C.F.R.§ 14.561
and §§ 42.1-42.47 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27
12. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
ii
2. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Page
Abbott Labs. v. United States, 573 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Allday v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 517 (1995).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
American Signature Inc., v. United States, 598 F.3d 816 (Fed. Cir. 2010).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Ardison v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 405 (1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 128 (1985). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28, 29
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28, 29
Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 115 S. Ct. 552 (1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 21, 26, 27
Bulloch v. United States, 763 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1985).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Caluza v. Brown,7 Vet.App. 498 (1995), aff'd per curiam, 78 F.3d 604 (Fed. Cir. 1996). . . . . . 18
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Caribbean Ispat Ltd. v. United States, 450 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Cathedral Candle Co. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 400 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2005). . . . . . . . . 20
Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Cogburn v. Shinseki, 24 Vet.App. 205 (2010). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 23
Cook v. Principi, 318 F. 3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21, 25
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Cushman v. Shinseki, 576 F.3d 1290 (Fed . Cir. 2009). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 21, 23, 25
D'Aries v. Peake, 22 Vet.App. 97 (2008). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
iii
CASES, Cont’d.
Page
Davis v. Principi, 276 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Elkins v. West, 12 Vet.App. 209 (1999). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Erspamer v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 3 (1990). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill et al, 332 U.S. 380, 68 S.Ct. 1 (1947). . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Gabrielson v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 36 (1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 49 (1990). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 18, 20
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 126 S.Ct. 904, 163 L.Ed. 748 (2006). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Gose v. United States Postal Serv., 451 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2006). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Green v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 121 (1991). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1998). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 23
In re: R. Greg Bailey, 182 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 1999).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Jackson v. Principi, 265 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
King v. St. Vincent's Hospital, 502 U.S. 215, 116 L. Ed. 2d 578, 112 S. Ct. 570 (1991).21, 26, 27
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet.App. 79 (2006). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Michalic v. Cleveland Tanker, Inc., 364 U.S. 325 (1960). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Moore v. Shinseki, 555 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2009). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 19
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 25
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Pierre v. West, 211 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2000).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Reizenstein v. Shinseki, 583 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2009). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20, 27
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
iv
CASES, Cont’d.
Page
Roberson v. Principi, 17 Vet.App. 135 (2003). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Roberts v. Shinseki, 23 Vet.App. 416 (2010) .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Passim
Roberts v. Shinseki, 643 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Cert. Den.)... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Roberts v. the United States of America, No. 08-788 Cert. Den. (U.S. Dec. 15, 2008).. . . . . . . 16
Russo v. Brown, 9 Vet.App. 46 (1996). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 20
Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Schafrath v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 589 (1991). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Suozzi v. Brown, 10 Vet.App. 307 (CAVC 1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Stefl v. Nicholson, 21 Vet.App. 120 (2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 20
Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
United States v. Georgia Thompson, 484 F.3d 877 (7th Cir. 2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
United States v. Roberts, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Wisconsin,
docket 05-CR-115. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 12, 13, 16, 18
United States v. Roberts, 534 F.3d 560 (7th Cir. July 7 2008) (Cert. Den.) 08-788
(December 15, 2008) .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
v
STATUTES AND OTHER MATERIAL
Page
U.S. Const. Amend. V. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 10, 21, 22, 26
U.S. Const. Amend. VI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 21, 22
5 U.S.C. App., Public Law 95-452, As Amended Through P.L. 114-317, enacted
December 16, 2016, the Inspector General Act of 1978. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 22, 29
5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301(2)(E), 5335(a)(B), 5372,
and 7521; the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 22, 29
18 U. S.C. § 1341.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
18 U. S.C. § 1343.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
31 U.S.C. §§ 3801-3812, the PFCRA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21, 22, 23, 27
38 U. S.C. § 1110.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
38 U. S.C. § 5107(b). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 10, 17
38 U.S.C. § 7109(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(1).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(4).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 11
38 U.S.C. § 7262. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
38 U.S.C. § 7292 (d)(1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
REGULATIONS
Page
38 C.F.R. § 3.103. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 10
38 C.F.R. § 3.105(d)(2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 10
38 C.F.R. § 4.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
38 C.F.R. § 4.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
38 C.F.R. § 4.126(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
38 C.F.R. § 14.561. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 10, 23, 29
38 C.F.R. §§ 42.1-42.47 (1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 17, 21, 23, 29
vi
RULES
Page
U.S. Vet. App. R. 28.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
U.S. Vet. App. R. 31.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
U.S. Vet. App. R. 30. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
MISCELLANEOUS
Page
DC 9434.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Adams, John, letter to Elbridge Gerry, December 5, 1777. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
DSM-5, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition, American
Psychiatric Association, Washington, DC 2005. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Manual M21-1 MR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Physicians Desk Reference (PDR) 61st Edition, Thomson, 2007, page 3347. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Sutherland Statutory Construction 46.01-.04 (5th ed. 1992) 2A Norman J. Singer,
(plain-meaning rule).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
United States. Cong. House. Committee on Veteran’s Affairs. Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations. Hearing, Jun. 30, 2010. Testimony of Matthew B. Tully, Esq.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
VA Notice of Proposed Rule Making RIN 2900-AO13, addressing willful misconduct and
benefits fraud. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
United States. Cong. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Overview of False Claims and Fraud
Legislation. Hearing, Jun. 17, 1986. 99th Cong. 2nd sess. Washington: GPO, 1987. (pages 46-47,
46-50).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
vii
3. TABLE OF RBA CITATIONS
RBA PAGE CITED AT BRIEF PAGE
R. at (00001-00023) BVA Cover Letter and Decision (December 30, 2015).. . . . . . . 1, 16, 17
R. at (00024-00029) BVA Cover Letter and Decision (May 15, 2014). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13, 15
R. at (00119-00126) Notice of Disagreement for Rating 5/27/2015
(September 15, 2015). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13, 16
R. at (00127-00128) VA Form 21-686c (August 6, 2015). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
R. at (00206-00209) VA Form 9 Re: PTSD claim (June 23, 2015). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
R. at (00217-00220) Military Service Medical Records, K. Roberts (August 4, 1969). . . . . 14
R. at (00221-00230) Military service performance evals. (March 1968 - December 1971).. 14
R. at (00231-00234) Bay Psychiatric Treatment Records (November 1, 1989). . . . . . . . . . . 24
R. at (00235-00237) Special Psychiatric Examination, Dr. Hastings
(March 13, 1991). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11,14, 24, 25
R. at (00238-00250) Forensic Psych Evaluation Report, Dr. Jason Dana
(March 14, 2006). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 17
R. at (00251-00273) Medical Records, Fox Valley VA (September 10, 1999). . . . . . . . . . . 17
R. at (00305-00325) Supplemental Statement of the Case (May 27, 2015). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
R. at (00463-00468) BVA Cover Letter and Decision (May 15, 2014). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13, 15
R. at (00489-00573) Transcript of BVA Hearing (February 3, 2014).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 15
R. at (01185-01259) Transcript of Grand Jury Proceedings (April 26, 2005).. . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
R. at (01309-01314) Criminal Summons for Mail Fraud (April 27, 2005).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
R. at (01379-01390) Affidavit of Keith A. Roberts (March 9, 2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
R. at (01395-01397) FOIA Letter, Am. Legion to James Gaughran (October 5, 2004). . . . . 16
R. at (01398-01403) FOIA Letter, Am. Legion to R. Szybala (October 15, 2004).. 5, 6, 16, 20
R. at (01411-01412) NOD from Am. Legion, Rating 11/11/2004 (December 13, 2004). . . . . 6
R. at (01413-01415) Email from R. Vasil to R. Szybala re: fraud (December 13, 2004). . 6, 24
R. at (01416-01419) Email from R. Szybala to D. Bevins re: fraud (January 27, 2005). . 6, 24
R. at (01420-01421) Email from R. Vasil to B. Nehls re: address (February 22, 2005). . . . . 6
R. at (01646-01742) Complete Transcript, Jury Trial, Sentencing (March 2, 2007). . . . . . . 18
viii
TABLE OF RBA CITATIONS, Cont’d.
RBA PAGE CITED AT BRIEF PAGE
R. at (01743-01890) Complete Transcript, Jury Trial, Day Three (November 8, 2006). . . . 18
R. at (03269-3288) Partial Videotape Examination of Keith A. Roberts (June 26, 2012). . . 18
R. at (03292-03304) VA Form 9: Appeal to Board of Veterans’ Appeals (June 27, 2013). . 12
R. at (03306-03322) Statement of the Case (June 24, 2013).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
R. at (03323-03334) Notice of Disagreement (June 13, 2013). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
R. at (03361-03371) Rating Decision, denies dysthymia (October 12, 2012).. . . . . . . . . . . . 12
R. at (03372-03382) Supp. Statement of the Case, denies dysthymia (October 10, 2012). . . 12
R. at (03384-03391) BVA Decision, remands dysthymia (September 28, 2012). . . . . . . . . . 12
R. at (03862-03956) 1st Amended Supp. Memo of Law, CAVC 05-2425 (August 16, 2010). 3
R. at (04007-04019) Affidavit of Keith A. Roberts (March 9, 2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
R. at (04094-04138) CAVC Decision, 05-2425 (April 17, 2010).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
R. at (04558-04566) VA Form 9 for SSOC dated 6/30/2008 (July 29, 2008). . . . . . . . . . . . 13
R. at (04567-04569) Milwaukee VARO Return of evidence to Veteran (July 31, 2008).. . . 13
R. at (05399-05408) VA Form 9: Appeal to Board of Veterans’ Appeals (April 28, 2008) 13
R. at (05410-05427) Statement of the Case, denies PTSD (April 14, 2008).. . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
R. at (06097) Deferred Rating, Dec. 1969 Psych. event valid stressor (September 6, 2006). 14
R. at (06108-06112) Certified List of Evidence, CAVC 05-2425 (September 22, 2005).. . . 13
R. at (06119-06161) BVA Decision, PTSD with dysthymia (August 26, 2005). . . . . 5, 11, 15
R. at (06164-06208) Transcript of BVA Hearing - Washington, DC
(June 13, 2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 7, 11, 15
R. at (06415-06417) Rating Decision, implements severance of PTSD (January 21, 2005). 11
R. at (06426-6430) Severance rating 01/20/2005. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
R. at (06484-97) Appellant letter to SECVA Principi 11/22/2004. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
R. at (06524) Memo, FOIA Officer to VARO re: claims file request (November 29, 2004). 18
R. at (06552-06560) Rating Decision, notice of severance of PTSD (November 10, 2004). 11
R. at (06678-06701) Rating Decision, Proposal to sever PTSD (August 16, 2004). . . 4, 11, 14
ix
TABLE OF RBA CITATIONS, Cont’d.
RBA PAGE CITED AT BRIEF PAGE
R. at (06707-06728) VA OIG Report of Investigation and attached Exhibits 1-91
(July 8, 2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
************** Begin VA OIG Report Exhibits**************
R. at (06827) VA OIG Report Exhibit 82: Report of Contact with DRO G. Georgia
(November 25, 2003). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (06828) VA OIG Report Exhibit 81: Report of Contact with Kay Hegg,
Program Analyst (November 25, 2003). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (06968-07006) VA OIG Report Exhibit 80: Transcript of DRO Hearing -
Milwaukee, WI (September 12, 2003). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (07102-07109) VA OIG Report Exhibit 79: Rating Decision, denies
eye/fatigue/obesity/ED (August 18, 2003). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (07613-07635) VA OIG Report Exhibit 77: DRO de novo review/SOC,
EED PTSD (January 21, 2003). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (07661-07669) VA OIG Report Exhibit 78: Transcript of DRO Hearing
(January 8, 2003).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (07727-07739) VA OIG Report Exhibit 69: Rating Decision, denies EED
for PTSD (June 11, 2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (07730) VA OIG Report Exhibit 70: VA Form 21-4138, requests DRO review
of case for EED determination (June 24, 2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (07740) VA OIG Report Exhibit 71: Notice of Disagreement for Rating Decision
dated 6/6/2002 (July 10, 2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (07741) VA OIG Report Exhibit 76: 21-4138, NOD for CUE re: PTSD and other
claims (January 16, 2003). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (07742) VA OIG Report Exhibit 72: Letter from Dr. DeMuri re: memo from
Dr. Gibson (October 21, 2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (07743) VA OIG Report Exhibit 73: PTSD Nexus from Dr. Bommakanti
for Roberts (October 23, 2002).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (07744) VA OIG Report Exhibit 74: Letter from Dr. Ackell, Appleton Cardiology
(October 30, 2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (07745-07746) VA OIG Report Exhibit 75: Letter from Roberts to Dr. Gibson
re: Dr. Demuri (November 20, 2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (07799-07956) VA OIG Report Exhibit 64: Rating Decision, increases PTSD
from 50% to 100% (June 8, 1999). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
x
TABLE OF RBA CITATIONS, Cont’d.
RBA PAGE CITED AT BRIEF PAGE
R. at (07957) VA OIG Report Exhibit 65: Vet letter to VA requesting copy of last psych
exam report (February 14, 2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (07958-07959) VA OIG Report Exhibit 66: Veteran’s Letter to J.W. Rublein
(February 18, 2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (07960) VA OIG Report Exhibit 67: Veteran’s FOIA Request, copy of claims file
(March 12, 2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (07961-07962) VA OIG Report Exhibit 68: Letter from Dr. Kliese to Dr. Harms
re: psych eval. (November 1, 1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (07963) VA OIG Report Exhibit 68: 21-4138 from Vet, requests EED to service date
(March 15, 2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (08047-08051) VA OIG Report Exhibit 63: C&P Exam/Report, Dr. Marcy,
Mental Disorders (April 27, 1999).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (08194-08197) VA OIG Report Exhibit 62: Notice of Disagreement for Rating
5/29/1998 (December 1, 1998). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (08221-08238) VA OIG Report Exhibit 61: Rating Decision, grants 50% PTSD
(May 29, 1998).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (08240) VA OIG Report Exhibit 60: Letter from J. W. Rublein to Milwaukee VAMC,
states that C&P for PTSD was insufficient for rating purposes (May 13, 1998).. . 11, 14
R. at (08241-08247) VA OIG Report Exhibit 58: C&P Examination, Dr. Daly,
PTSD (March 31, 1998).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (08266-08267) VA OIG Report Exhibit 59: Oconto County Domestic Violence
Report (April 3, 1998). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (08282) VA OIG Report Exhibit 57: C&P Exam Instructions, only use Holland
stressor (October 24, 1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (08396-08397) VA OIG Report Exhibit 56: Vet proof of in-service stressor,
death certificate (October 24, 1997). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (08398-08404) VA OIG Report Exhibit 55: VA Letter and SSOC (May 4, 1995). 11, 14
R. at (08428) VA OIG Report Exhibit 53: VA Letter, Mississippi scale did not show
clinical analysis (January 26, 1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (08429) VA OIG Report Exhibit 54: Request from Vet for Navy records from
Naples, Italy (March 8, 1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (08434-08446) VA OIG Report Exhibit 51: Supplemental SOC, denies PTSD
(January 11, 1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
xi
TABLE OF RBA CITATIONS, Cont’d.
RBA PAGE CITED AT BRIEF PAGE
R. at (08435) VA OIG Report Exhibit 52: Letter from Vet about evidence used for
PTSD denial (January 13, 1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (08494-08497) VA OIG Report Exhibit 49: Supplemental SOC, denies MDD/PTSD
(September 26, 1994).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (08503-08530) VA OIG Report Exhibit 50: VESI and Mississippi Scale Tests
(September 26, 1994).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (08534-08536) VA OIG Report Exhibit 49: Rating Decision, denies MDD and PTSD
(September 17, 1994).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (08564) VA OIG Report Exhibit 48: Vet letter to Mr. John Kuehl re: FOIA request
for records (March 26, 1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (08563) VA OIG Report Exhibit 47: VA Letter confirms receipt of claims file
copy request (March 22, 1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (08567) VA OIG Report Exhibit 46: 21-4138: Vet wishes to claim depression
and PTSD (March 10, 1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (08574-08575) VA OIG Report Exhibit 45: Letter from VA req. development
info on PTSD (March 1, 1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (08583) VA OIG Report Exhibit 44: Letter from DAV to cancel hearing and
open PTSD claim (February 18, 1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (08598) VA OIG Report Exhibit 43: Vet letter requesting copies of pay scales
(February 7, 1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (08610-08617) VA OIG Report Exhibit 42: Statement of the Case, denies
psychiatric disorder (December 22, 1993).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (08619) VA OIG Report Exhibit 41: Notice of Disagreement from Veteran
(December 3, 1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (08658) VA OIG Report Exhibit 38: Letter from S. Eisfelder to D. Wallin
re: domestic violence treatment sessions (October 25, 1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (08659-08662) VA OIG Report Exhibit 37: C&P Exam Report, Dr. Sherry,
Mental Disorders (September 17, 1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (08663) VA OIG Report Exhibit 39: Letter from B. Retzlaff to D. Wallin
re: Oconto County domestic violence services (October 27, 1993).. . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (08664-08665) VA OIG Report Exhibit 40: Rating Decision, denies personality
disorder (October 27, 1993).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (08695-08698) VA OIG Report Exhibit 35: VA Form 21-526: Vet’s Application
for Comp/Pension (July 9, 1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
xii
TABLE OF RBA CITATIONS, Cont’d.
RBA PAGE CITED AT BRIEF PAGE
R. at (08699-08700) VA OIG Report Exhibit 36: Vet Letter to VA re: treatment from
Dr. Yanis (September 10, 1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (08745-08746) VA OIG Report Exhibit 33: Letter of medical eligibility for
NSC pension (April 1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (08749) VA OIG Report Exhibit 34: FOIA letter from Vet requesting copy
of last exam (April 21, 1993).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (08754-08755) VA OIG Report Exhibit 32: Rating, grants dysthymia/CAD/DJD/PE,
NSC 80% (March 19, 1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (08761-08764) VA OIG Report Exhibit 31: C&P Exam Report, Dr. Hastings,
Mental Disorders (March 9, 1993).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (08822-08823) VA OIG Report Exhibit 30: Vet letter to Congressman Roth
re: heart claims (February 4, 1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (08838-08839) VA OIG Report Exhibit 28: FOIA Letter requesting copy of
claims file/medical evidence (January 4, 1992).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (08850) VA OIG Report Exhibit 29: Letter from DAV to VARO re: psychiatric
assessment (February 4, 1993).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (08854-08855) VA OIG Report Exhibit 27: Rating Decision, denies increase
in heart rating (December 17, 1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (08859-08861) VA OIG Report Exhibit 26: DRO Decision, denies s/c pension
(December 10, 1992).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (09020-09024) VA OIG Report Exhibit 24: C&P Exam Report, Dr. Sherry,
Mental Disorders (November 16, 1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (09073-09088) VA OIG Report Exhibit 25: C&P Exam Report, Dr. Peplinski,
Spine (November 13, 1992).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (09107-09145) VA OIG Report Exhibit 23: Transcript of DRO Hearing,
Milwaukee, WI (October 5, 1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (09147) VA OIG Report Exhibit 22: VA Form 9 for HTN, angina, CAD
(August 5, 1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (09161) VA OIG Report Exhibit 18: Vet letter to Congressman Toby Roth
re: claims denial (June 19, 1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (09162) VA OIG Report Exhibit 19: Letter to J. Baker from T. Roth re:
claims denial (July 14, 1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (09163-09173) VA OIG Report Exhibit 20: Statement of the Case, denies
s/c pension (July 1, 1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
xiii
TABLE OF RBA CITATIONS, Cont’d.
RBA PAGE CITED AT BRIEF PAGE
R. at (09174-09175) VA OIG Report Exhibit 21: VARO Director's Letter to
Congressman Roth (July 17, 1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (09191-09192) VA OIG Report Exhibit 17: Rating Decision, continues
pension denial (June 24, 1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (09205) VA OIG Report Exhibit 16: Notice of Disagreement for Rating
dated 4/23/91 (February 26, 1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (09212-09213) VA OIG Report Exhibit 14: Rating Decision, denies pension
(April 23, 1991). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (XXXX) VA OIG Report Exhibit 15 (missing): Letter from Dr. Thatcher that was
included in OIG report. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (09219-09221) VA OIG Report Exhibit 13: Rating Decision, denies
fracture/PE/elbow/TDIU (March 28, 1991).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (09261-09263) VA OIG Report Exhibit 12: Special Psychiatric Examination,
Dr. Hastings (March 13, 1991). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14, 24
R. at (09383-09384) VA OIG Report Exhibit 11: Rating Decision, denies
hearing/knee/TDIU (February 29, 1991). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (09387-09388) VA OIG Report Exhibit 10: Rating Decision, grants 50%
combined (February 7, 1991).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (09408) VA OIG Report Exhibit 09: 21-2507: Request for Physical Examination
(December 21, 1990). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (09436-09438) VA OIG Report Exhibit 08: 21-527: Income-Net Worth and
Employment Statement (September 7, 1990). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (09447) VA OIG Report Exhibit 07: Statement in Support of Claim re: cardiac
(October 30, 1990). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (09451) VA OIG Report Exhibit 06: Rating Decision, denies TDIU
(May 1, 1987).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (09456) VA OIG Report Exhibit 05: Rating Decision, grants 30% for CAD
(April 24, 1987). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (09479-09482) VA OIG Report Exhibit 04: 21-526: Application for Medical
Benefits (February 25, 1987). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (09483-09505) VA OIG Report Exhibit 83: Military Service Records, Gary Holland
(April 30, 2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (09506-09548) VA OIG Report Exhibit 84: Military Service Records, Keith Roberts
(April 30, 2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
xiv
TABLE OF RBA CITATIONS, Cont’d.
RBA PAGE CITED AT BRIEF PAGE
R. at (09574-09596) VA OIG Report Exhibit 85: Command History Report, NAF,
Naples, Italy (February 27, 1970). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (09597-09661) VA OIG Report Exhibit 86: Original 1969 JAG Manual Report
of Investigation (1969).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (09662-09663) VA OIG Report Exhibit 87: Memorandum of Interview,
William W. Stewart (February 23, 2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (09664) VA OIG Report Exhibit 88: Memorandum of Interview, Timmy R. Smith
(January 30, 2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (09665-09666) VA OIG Report Exhibit 89: Memorandum of Interview,
Samuel J. Chiarella (March 18, 2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (09667) VA OIG Report Exhibit 90: Memorandum of Interview,
Martin P. Sunglao (February 24, 2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (09668-09669) VA OIG Report Exhibit 91: Memorandum of Interview,
Keith A. Roberts (March 31, 2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (09670) VA OIG Report Exhibit 01: Statement of Roger T. Jaimeyfield
(February 4, 1969). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (09671) VA OIG Report Exhibit 01: Memorandum of Interview,
Richard L. McFadden (January 7, 2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (09672) VA OIG Report Exhibit 01: Statement of Richard L. McFadden
(February 4, 1969). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (09673) VA OIG Report Exhibit 01: Memorandum of Interview, Max E. Johnson
(December 9, 2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (09674) VA OIG Report Exhibit 01: Statement of Max E. Johnson
(February 4, 1969). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (09675-09676) VA OIG Report Exhibit 01: Memorandum of Interview,
Keith J. Dreher (December 7, 2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (09677-09678) VA OIG Report Exhibit 01: Statement of Keith J. Dreher
(February 4, 1969). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (09680-09681) VA OIG Report Exhibit 02: Navy Psych Evaluation Report
(December 23, 1969).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14
R. at (09682-9683) VA OIG Report Exhibit 03: Military Records for K. Roberts,
includes medical (July 22, 1968). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 14, 24
************** End of VA OIG Report Attachments**************
xv
TABLE OF RBA CITATIONS, Cont’d.
RBA PAGE CITED AT BRIEF PAGE
R. at (06772-06785) Veteran's Letter to Secretary A. Principi (December 23, 2003) . . . . . . 23
R. at (06787) Ltr J. Baker to L. Evans re: file tfr to VAOIG 12/12/03
(December 18, 2003) ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
R. at (07407-07416) Rating Decision partial grant (March 28, 2003). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
R. at (09212-09213) Rating Decision, denies pension (April 23, 1991).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
R. at (09479-09482) 21-526: Application for Medical Benefits (February 25, 1987). . . . . . 14
R. at (09483-09505) Military Service Records, Gary Holland (April 30, 2004).. . . . . . . . . . 13
R. at (09506-09548) Military Service Records, Keith Roberts (April 30, 2004). . . . . . . . . . 14
R. at (09679-09708) Military Records for K. Roberts, includes medical (July 22, 1968). . . 10
R. at (09744-09754) Rating Decision, grants 30% dysthymia eff. 7/16/92
(May 27, 2015). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 13, 16
R. at (09769-09782) Rating Decision, grants 30% dysthymia eff. 7/16/92
(May 27, 2015). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 13, 15
R. at (09783-09814) Initial PTSD DBQ, Dr. Marcellino (May 7, 2015). . . . . 7, 10, 13, 15, 17
R. at (09815-09818) Medical Opinion, Dr. O’Neil re: PTSD (March 24, 2015). . . . . . . . . . 13
R. at (09874-09884) Rating Decision (October 11, 2012). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
R. at (10114-10117) Emails between VA staff & R. Vasil re: debt (Aug. - Sept. 2015). . . . . 8
R. at (10136-10143) NOD/Acctng/Req. for Hearing to DMC & VARO (January 2, 2013).. . 8
R. at (10144) DMC Email discussing Vasil going to BVA (September 15, 2015).. . . . . . . . 10
R. at (10178-10314) Part One: Video Deposition of Keith Roberts (June 29, 2012). . . . . . . 18
R. at (10315-10581) Complete Transcript, Jury Trial, Day Two (November 7, 2006).. . . . . 18
R. at (10913-10987) Transcript of Grand Jury Proceedings Re: Vasil (April 26, 2005).. . . . . 4
R. at (10988-10996) Transcript of Grand Jury Proceedings Re: Vasil (September 13, 2005). 4
R. at (11117-11119) Letter from S. Biskupic to Judge Griesbach re: debt (May 30, 2006). . . 7
R. at (11317-11574) Complete Transcript, Jury Trial, Day One (November 6, 2006). . . . . . 18
xvi
4. CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC SERVICE
I, Robert P. Walsh, hereby certify that I have:
1. Filed this document using the Electronic Filing System of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for Veterans Claims which will automatically send it to counsel for the Appellee,
Brent A. Bowker, Esq.
Office of General Counsel (027B)
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs
810 Vermont Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20420
Telephone (202) 632-6909
Telecopier (202) 495-6104
E-mail: brent.bowker@va.gov
And;
2. I have mailed a copy of this document to the Appellant by first class mail at his
address of record.
/s/ ROBERT P. WALSH Dated: 06/29/2017
ROBERT P. WALSH (P42833)
Attorney for Appellant
Two West Michigan Avenue
Suite 301
Battle Creek, Michigan 49017-7002
Telephone (269) 962-9693
Telecopier (269) 962-9592
E-mail: rpwalsh@SBCglobal.net
xvii
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR VETERANS CLAIMS
KEITH A. ROBERTS, ))
Appellant, ))
v. ))
Vet. App. No. 16-1219
DAVID J. SHULKIN, M.D., )
SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, )))
Appellee. )
5. FIRST AMENDED OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT
The Appellant, Keith A. Roberts, (hereinafter Appellant), pursuant to U.S. Vet. App. R.
28 and 31, respectfully submits to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
(CAVC or Court) the first amended opening brief of the appellant.
In support of this claim, the Appellant relies upon the Corrected Record Before the
Agency filed with the Court on December 27, 2016, and referred to as (RBA xx ) and any
appendix filed with this brief referred to as (App. at ).
There are errors of both fact and law contained in the Board of Veterans Appeals (BVA)
decision dated December 30, 2015, in docket 03-04 265, (RBA 0002-0033), in which the Board
concluded that new and material evidence had not been submitted such that the claim for
restoration of benefits for post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) could not be reopened.
The Board remanded the issue of the grant of 30 percent for other mental conditions with
an effective date of July 16, 1992, as a Notice of Disagreement had been filed but no Statement
of the Case had been issued.
1
6. INTRODUCTION
In a report concerning workers’ compensation fraud, the VA OIG has stated that:
“ Federal statutes prohibit employing agencies from conducting
criminal fraud investigations, limiting agencies solely to the review
of the extent of medical impairment of the claimant. Criminal fraud
investigations may be conducted only by authorized law enforcement
agencies.”
Signed by Michael L. Staley, Assistant Inspector General for Auditing, U.S. Department
of Veterans Affairs, August 13, 2004.
Applicants for VA benefits, even if ultimately deemed not entitled to those benefits, have
a constitutionally protected property interest in those benefits under the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Cushman v. Shinseki, 576 F.3d 1290, 1297–98
(Fed. Cir. 2009); see also Cogburn v. Shinseki, 24 Vet.App. 205, 209–10 (2010). They cannot
be denied those benefits without due process of law, which includes notice and a fair opportunity
to be heard. Cushman, 576 F.3d at 1296; Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306 (1950).
When Congress mandated standard benefits fraud adjudication procedures for the entire
federal government the then Veterans Administration (VA) promulgated the regulations as 38
C.F.R.§§ 42.1-42.47. These regulations meet or exceed all of the due process protections
required by the Administrative Procedures Act, (APA) 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq. See the letter from
Prof. Harold Hastings Bruff to Sen. William S. Cohen dated April 11, 19861. The regulations
have sat for decades unused and unremarked. There is no mention of these regulations in M21-
MR.2 During the supplemental briefing in Roberts v. Shinseki, 23 Vet.App. 416, (2010)
1 United States. Cong. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Overview of False Claims and
Fraud Legislation. Hearing, Jun. 17, 1986. 99th Cong. 2nd sess. Washington: GPO, 1987. (pages
46-47, 46-50).
2 In the VA Notice of Proposed Rule Making RIN 2900-AO13, addressing willful misconduct
and benefits fraud the regulations at 38 C.F.R.§§ 42.1-42.47 were not cited. Comments
regarding these issues were submitted by counsel for the Appellant in a letter dated March 17,
2014.
2
(Roberts I), the VA Office of General Counsel (VA OGC) asserted that the regulations
were not applicable to the Roberts case, and that in the regulation that defines the role of the
general counsel in fraud matters, 38 C.F.R.§ 14.561, that the plain meaning of “claims” in the
regulation was referring to contractor and federal tort claims, not benefits claims. (RBA 3877,
3871-3885).
Counsel for the Appellant submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the
Secretary inquiring as to how many VA benefits fraud investigations had been undertaken during
the period of January 1, 2004, through December 31, 2013. On January 20, 2015, the VA OIG
responded that 4,211 investigations had been conducted. 2,334 cases were referred to the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ)(or state prosecutor’s offices3) for prosecution. 1,358 cases were
accepted by the U.S. Attorneys. There were 1,178 cases declined by prosecutors. There were
1,997 indictments or criminal complaints. There were 1,357 convictions. There were no
proceedings under 38 C.F.R.§§ 42.1-42.47. None. Responding to an identical FOIA request
covering the same period the Social Security Administration (SSA) had conducted over 1,000
fraud inquiries, of which over 300 resulted in formal proceedings under their version of the fraud
regulation. A majority of the allegations were screened out by the SSA General Counsel. The
Secretary had procured the prosecution and conviction of these veterans and beneficiaries for
benefits fraud by direct referrals to various United States Attorneys. The regulations call for a
referral to a specific office at DOJ, not for direct contact with local U.S. Attorneys.
The Roberts Court was confounded by the interaction between the due process provisions
of 38 C.F.R.§§ 3.103 and 3.105(d) in the fraud proceedings undertaken by the VA OIG and the
Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA). That is understandable in light of the fact that the VA
OIG has no role in benefits fraud matters beyond referring an allegation to the VA Office of
General Counsel (VA OGC) and in some cases to the U.S. Department of Justice. Agents of the
3 The VA OIG attempted to have a local Air Force retiree prosecuted in the Indiana state court
based on an allegation of VA medical travel pay fraud. The trial court agreed with the veteran
that the state had no jurisdiction in the matter. Counsel fails to comprehend any set of facts in
which an action in state court would be appropriate in a VA benefits fraud allegation.
3
VA OIG are not federal law enforcement officers. That role is contrary to the underlying
philosophy of the Inspectors General Act. Second, the VBA has no role in benefits fraud matters
other than reporting suspected fraud to the VA OIG and later for the implementation of the
findings of fact and rulings of law from the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). This if a finding
of fraud is made in accordance with 38 C.F.R.§§ 42.1-42.47, and after any appeal to the Federal
District Court provided for in the regulations. In this and other VBA fraud cases the
adjudication of the fraud allegation is conducted under a constitutionally unfirm ad hoc process.
VBA practice is that in a notice of proposal to sever benefits for fraud that the underlying
evidence is not to be disclosed to the veteran. See the letter dated August 18, 2004.
“We are writing to you about your disability compensation.
It is proposed to sever service connection for post traumatic stress disorder with
depression/dysthymia effective August 4, 1993 and sever basic eligibility under
38 USC, Chapter 35, effective April 27, 1999.
We propose to stop your benefits effective September l, 1993.
This adjustment will result in an overpayment of benefits which have
been paid to you. If the proposed action is implemented, you will be
notified of the exact amount of the overpayment and given repayment
information.” (RBA 6678-6681).
The entire matter is adjudicated by VBA and OIG employees and is devoid of any due
process or probable cause review by the VA OGC. Also contrary to the congressional mandate
referrals for prosecution are “shopped” directly from investigating VA OIG Agents to U.S.
Attorneys. The law provides for a referral to the Attorney General, not directly to U.S.
Attorneys. In this case there was no federal law enforcement involvement until the Appellant
surrendered himself the U.S. Marshall at the day of his arraignment. The only testimony every
provided to the Federal Grand Jury in this case was by a VA OIG agent on April 26, 2005 (RBA
10913-10987) and on September 13, 2005. (RBA 10988-10966). As demonstrated below that
testimony was factually and legally flawed. The VA claims adjudication process is intended to
be ex parte, claimant friendly, and non-adversarial. Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115; 115 S. Ct.
552 (1994), Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
4
Fraud is quasi criminal in nature. An allegation of fraud is inherently adversarial. Once
an allegation of fraud has been made, the process mandated by Congress and found in 38
C.F.R.§§ 42.1-42.47 must be afforded to the accused beneficiary.
In this case, Mr. Philip R. Wilkerson of the American Legion wrote to the Director of
VBA Compensation and Pension Service (CPS), Renee Szybala, on October 15, 2004, and
demanded a hearing under 38 C.F.R.§§ 42.1-42.47, and a copy of the benefits claims file. (RBA
1399, 1398-1402). The original file had been seized by the VA OIG on December 12, 2003.
(RBA 6787 ). The Board made the August 26, 2005, decision (RBA 6119-6161) based on the
review of an incomplete photocopy of the benefits claims file.
Employees of the VBA may not conduct or participate in fraud adjudications. But in this
case, the Director of the VBA Compensation and Pension Service (CPS) actually orchestrated
the prosecution of the Appellant while she knew that a final agency decision had never been
promulgated on his benefits appeals. Until the remanded portion of the Board’s December 30,
2015, decision and the appeal pending below on the restoration of the 100 percent rate for
anxiety as shown in service is decided, damages to the government, if any, cannot be calculated.
At this time the U.S. Government maintains that the Appellant owes them over $350,000.00.
There were no exigent circumstances in this case which warranted fast tracking the
criminal prosecution of the Appellant.
To add insult to injury the director of CPS at the time, Renee Szybala, is a licensed
attorney. While at VA OGC she had been involved with the Appellant’s case. In a “round
robin” email sent on January 27, 2005, she wrote that:
“From: Szybala, Renee, VBAVACO
Sent: Thursday, January 27, 2005 2:28PM
* * *
“I have known of and been dealing with Mr. Roberts' complaints for several
years now, dating to my time at OGC as explained in the message below.
Most recently, I responded to his letter to the Secretary of November 22, 2004,
which requested that the Milwaukee RO's decisions severing, on the basis of
fraud, his service connection for PTSD be reversed. My response, dated
January 04, 2005, told him that the decisions of the Milwaukee RO were
reviewed by C&P and appear to be correct. It also told him that:
• I read his letter as a valid Notice of Disagreement with Milwaukee's severance
5
decisions and would forward it to Milwaukee so that they could initiate
appropriate appellate review, and
• that his letter spoke of an assault he suffered while in the Navy in 1969, which
appeared to be new evidence to support a PTSD claim, and that I would forward
it to the Milwaukee RO requesting that they address that matter.
I did so on January 4, 2005. We'll now check with Milwaukee to confirm that the
appropriate reviews are on track. In the interest of full disclosure, I also have
a letter on this case from the American Legion, dated October 15, 2004, to which
I have not yet responded. The fraud for which Mr. Roberts' service connection
was severed was uncovered, investigated and reported by the OIG. To respond
to the Legion's letter, we need to confer with the OIG and have had trouble
connecting. When we do, we'll ask them the question about prosecution, too.
My guess is, however, that this case would not interest a U.S. Attorney.
Those offices have monetary and other thresholds that a case like this likely
doesn't meet.” (RBA 1416).
In November of 2003 the Appellant contacted the VA OIG in Washington, D.C. over
concerns that his benefits claims file had been altered and that he could not obtain verbatim
transcripts from his local hearings. He was referred to the Chicago office of the VA OIG.
Rather than assist the Appellant and investigate his claims the agent coordinated with the VARO
Milwaukee director, Jon Baker, to investigate the Appellant. See the affidavit of the Appellant
dated March 9, 2007. (RBA 4007-4016).
The VA OIG report of investigation alleging benefits fraud was placed in the benefits
claims file, which is apparently the normal procedure in VA fraud cases. The VBA then refused
to provide a copy of the either the claims file or the report of investigation to the Appellant or his
representative, the American Legion. (RBA 1399, 1398-1402). See the email from VA OIG
dated January 27, 2005, from the VA investigator confirming that the Appellant had been denied
access to the OIG investigative report. (RBA 1413). The Appellant and his representatives were
not permitted to examine the record at the Board hearing held in Washington, D.C., on June 13,
2003.4 The Appellant would not see the OIG report and the allegations against him until it was
produced in criminal discovery in United States v. Roberts, U.S. District Court, Eastern District
of Wisconsin, docket 05-CR-115.
4 During the first oral argument held in 05-2425, October 23, 2008, then Chief Judge Greene
inquired of Counsel for the Appellant regarding the denial to the Appellant and his
representative of a copy of the record or the right to review the claims file at the Board hearing
on June 13, 2005 (RBA 6164-6208). The matter seemed troubling to the Court.
6
Some of the more troubling aspects of the VBA and VA OIG ad hoc benefits fraud
process are as follows:
1. Unverified and unproven allegations are placed in the benefits file which is not well
restricted. If disproved, how are they removed?
2. Notice of the allegations against the veteran is defective.
3. There is no adequate probable cause determination or other review by VA legal
counsel.
4. The case may be adjudicated by some of the same VBA and VA OIG employees who
have alleged fraud. This is inherently adversarial. See the email from the VA Debt
Management Center dated September 16, 2015, discussing VA OIG Agent Vasil’s continuing
participation in this case. This in response to genuine concerns by an employee at VA Central
Office dated August 31, 2015, that if the benefits are fully restored (they had just been restored
to 30% in the rating dated May 27, 2015) (RBA 9744-9756; 9769-9782) that the debt being
collected would not actually be owed. (RBA 10114). See also the C and P examination report
from Dr. Robert L. Marcellino dated May 21, 2015) (RBA 9783-9818) which resolves a majority
of the concerns raised in the dissent in Roberts I, by Judges Hagel and Scholen. Roberts, 23
Vet.App. 416, 432-450 (2010). See the letter from the U.S. Attorney to the trial court dated May
30, 2006, describing the role played by Renee Szybala in assisting with the criminal prosecution.
(RBA 11,117-8).
5. The veteran may be forced to defend against allegations in the administrative and
criminal forum at the same time. That was the situation here when the Appellant had to seek
leave of the Federal District Court to travel to Washington, D.C. for his Board hearing on June
13, 2005. (RBA 6164-6161).
The Secretary “bootstrapped” a non-final VA benefits adjudication into a criminal
indictment and conviction. The U.S. Attorney and Grand Jury were told the Navy witnesses
would corroborate that the Appellant was not present when Gary Holland was injured. They did
not.
7
6. There is no calculation of damages by the agency to a sum certain as required. In this
case the damages were essentially pie in the sky numbers developed at the criminal sentencing.
Since then the VA Debt Management Center has adjusted the debt upward on several occasions
absent any due process. A request for a hearing on the record and a full accounting of damages
for the Appellant has been pending since at least January 2, 2013. (RBA 10136-10177). It is for
the ALJ to make findings of fact as to damages for the Secretary under 38 C.F.R.§§ 42.1-42.47 .
As noted above, many of the allegations of benefits fraud made against veterans proved
unfounded. Because VA OGC did not hold the record of the matter in a restricted system of
records the reputation of the subject of the allegations may be irreparably harmed. Had the VA
OGC conducted the review and used the procedure in 38 C.F.R.§§ 42.1-42.47 there would be no
indication of any allegation in the claims file unless there was a final adverse determination by
the Secretary based on consent or findings of fact and rulings of law from the ALJ.
7. No notice of right to counsel. A fraud allegation is inherently adversarial and quasi
criminal. The regulations provide for notice of a right to counsel, access to subpoenas, a detailed
complaint outlining the allegations with specificity, and an appeal of right to a Federal District
Court.
Are veterans and other VA beneficiaries entitled to the same due process protections as
participants in other federal benefits programs?
The Appellant was forced to defend himself in two forums simultaneously, The VBA and
criminal court, was denied access to the charges and evidence used against him, and was
convicted of receiving payments from the VA for service connected disability benefits. These
same benefits have now been partially restored (30%) as of May 27, 2015, for the same period
used in the criminal case. (RBA 9769-9782). This has been so far a Pyrrhic victory, as VA Debt
management has seized most of the award. (RBA 10,114). Does this Court have the authority to
order a refund of 30 percent of the days he was incarcerated? Had the Congressionally mandated
procedure been followed the Appellant would have never been indicted or convicted and the
final resolution of his benefits appeals so long delayed.
8
7. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I. WHETHER THE SECRETARY FAILED TO COMPLY WITH
THE ORDER OF THIS COURT IN ROBERTS V. SHINSEKI,
23 VET.APP 416, DATED APRIL 23, 2010.
A. The Board failed to comply with 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1)
when it did not adequately state the reasons or bases for
denying reopening the claim for service connection for
post traumatic stress disorder based upon new and
material evidence.
II. THE SECRETARY HAS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH
THE CONGRESSIONALLY MANDATED DUE PROCESS
PROTECTIONS REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF BENEFITS
FRAUD FOUND IN HIS OWN REGULATIONS, 38 C.F.R.
§§ 42.1-42.47, IMPLEMENTING THE PROGRAM FRAUD
CIVIL REMEDIES ACT OF 1986, AND THUS DEPRIVED
THE APPELLANT AND HIS FAMILY OF DUE PROCESS
OF LAW.
III. THE BOARD ERRED WHEN IT ENDORSED VIOLATIONS
BY THE SECRETARY OF THE FIFTH AND SIXTH
AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
RESULTING IN THE UNLAWFUL DEPRIVATION OF THE
LIBERTY AND PROPERTY OF THE APPELLANT.
A. Free Standing Constitutional Claims.
B. The regulations found in 38 C.F.R.§ 14.561 and
§§ 42.1-42.47 must be followed in order to comply
with the due process requirements of the Administrative
Procedures Act.
C. The $150,000.00 limit found in the PFCRA is not
applicable in this case.
D. Employees of the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs
cannot adjudicate benefits fraud allegations.
E. The agency Office of General Counsel failed to
meet it’s obligations to the Appellant as the
reviewing official under 38 C.F.R.§ 14.561
and §§ 42.1-42.47.
8. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal as it was timely filed and concerns the
failure of the Board to properly apply the regulations, statutes, and controlling precedent case
law relevant to the comprehensive re-adjudication and service connection for post traumatic
9
stress disorder. In addition, the Appellant properly raised significant due process challenges to
the denial of a hearing regarding damages as well as the misrepresentations made by VA
employees which resulted in an adverse ruling by this Court in the prior adjudication.
The relevant statutes are 38 U.S.C. §§ 7104(d)(1); 7262(a)(1); and 7261(a)(4).
The relevant regulations are 38 C.F.R.§§ 3.103; 3.105(d) and the benefits fraud
procedures at 38 C.F.R.§§ 42.1-42.47.
The relevant cases are, in part, Roberts v. Shinseki, 23 Vet.App. 416 (2010)(Roberts I) ;
D'Aries v. Peake, 22 Vet.App. 97 (2008), Moore v. Shinseki, 555 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ,
and Stefl v. Nicholson, 21 Vet.App. 120 (2007).
9. STANDARD FOR REVIEW
The issue before the Court concerns the failure of the Board to provide an adequate
reasons and bases for the decision to deny the reopening of the claim for service connection for
PTSD after the significant additions and corrections to the record, the hearing held on February
3, 2014, the report of Dr. Jason Dana (RBA 238-250) and the C and P examination of Dr.
Marcellino dated May 21, 2015 (RBA 9783-9814) . This evidence resulted in the partial
restoration of benefits in a rating decision dated May 27, 2015, service connected benefits under
DC 9434 to 30 percent effective July 16, 1992. (RBA 9769-9782).
Findings of the Board as to service connection are both factual and legal. The factual
findings are reviewed by the Court under the clearly erroneous standard under 38 U.S.C. §
7261(a)(4). See Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 49, 53 (1990); Russo v. Brown, 9 Vet.App. 46,
50 (1996).
As to matters of law the review is to be de novo. 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(1); Elkins v. West
12 Vet.App. 209 (1999); Roberson v. Principi, 17 Vet.App. 135 (2003).
This case presents both factual and legal issues. The Appellant challenges the findings of
the Board that denied entitlement to reopening of his claim for service connected PTSD based
upon new and material evidence, to include the criminal trial and grand jury transcripts, a new
10
VA compensation and pension examination, and the examination and report provided to the
criminal court.
10. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I. Course of Proceedings Below.
March 28, 2003. Rating grants effective date of July 16, 1992, for PTSD etc. at 100%.
(RBA 7407-7416).
December 21, 2003. Transfer of original VA benefits claims file to VA OIG Agent Ray
Vasil. (RBA 6787).
July 8, 2004. VA OIG report of investigation provided the VA Regional Office and U.S.
Attorney for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. (6707-6728) Exhibits to the report. (RBA 9212-
9708).
August 18, 2004. Proposal to sever. (RBA 6678-6681).
November 10, 2004. Rating decision severs benefits. (RBA 6552-60).
January 20, 2005. VA rating decision benefits severed to July 16, 1992. (RBA 6426-30).
April 26, 2005. Federal Grand Jury issues an indictment and summons under 18 U.S.C.
§1341, mail fraud. (RBA 1309-1314).
May 16, 2005. Arraigned in the Federal District Court for the E.D. of Wisconsin, docket
1:05-CR-00118-WCG, U.S. v. Roberts.
June 13, 2005. BVA hearing, Washington, D.C. (Transcript) (RBA 6164-6208).
(Roberts required leave of the District Court to attend).
August 26, 2005. BVA decision. (RBA 6119-6161).
August 30, 2005. Notice of Docketing CAVC docket 05-2425.
September 9, 2005. 05-2425. Counsel for the Appellant, Barton Stichman and Christine
Coté appeared.
September 13, 2005. U.S. v. Roberts. Superceding indictment for wire fraud, 18 U.S.C.
§1343. VA OIG agent R. Vasil gave all of the grand jury testimony in the criminal matter. No
federal law enforcement agency participated in the case.
11
November 6-8, 2006. U.S. v. Roberts. Criminal trial in Green Bay, Wisconsin. Guilty
verdict.
March 2, 2007. U.S. v. Roberts, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Wisconsin,
docket 05-CR-115. A trial by jury resulted in a sentence of 48 months and an order to pay $262,
943.52 in restitution. U.S. v. Roberts Sentencing hearing. Appellant taken in to custody.
March 7, 2007. Appellant incarcerated.
July 7, 2008. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, affirmed in U.S. v.
Roberts, 534 F.3d 560 (7th Cir. 2008). A Petition for Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the
United States was denied, Roberts v. the United States of America, No. 08-788 (U.S. Dec. 15,
2008).
October 23, 2008. 05-2425. Oral argument, three judge panel.
July 29, 2009. 05-2425, en banc oral argument was held.
March 17, 2010. Released to a half way house.
Roberts v. Shinseki, 23 Vet.App. 416 ( April 23, 2010)
Roberts v. Shinseki, 643 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. June 1, 2011) (Cert. Den. March 19, 2012)
A. Board remand Order of September 28, 2012, implementation of the
Courts remand.
Board orders remand and actions to both comply with the order of the Court in Roberts
and to also adjudicate the appeal filed on July 29, 2008. (RBA 3384-3391).
October 10, 2012. SSOC. VARO cannot establish service connection for depression and
dysthymia. Benefits previously severed and decision upheld by CAVC and Federal Circuit.
(RBA 3372-3382).
October 12, 2012. VA rating decision. Denies service connection for dysthymia,
depression and anxiety (shown in service). (RBA 9874-84).
June 13, 2013. NOD for 10/12/12 rating. (RBA 3323-3334).
June 24, 2013. SOC denies dysthymia and depression. (RBA 3306-3322).
June 27, 2013. VA-9, June 24, 2013, SOC. (RBA 3292-3304).
12
November 19, 2013. BVA Motion and brief, restore benefits. (RBA 617-679).
February 3, 2014. BVA hearing. Transcript (RBA 0489-0573).
May 15, 2014. BVA remand to enforce the CAVC opinion. (RBA 0026-0029).
March 24, 2015. Dr. O’Neil states the entire clinical and service record must be
reviewed and an initial mental health exam with testing conducted. (RBA 0386-87).
May 21, 2015. Dr. Marcellino submits mental health C and P report based on record
review and interview with Appellant and wife on May 7, 2015. (RBA 9783-9814).
May 27, 2015. VA rating, restores service connection for mental conditions effective
July 16, 1992, but only to 30%. (RBA 9744, 9754, 9769-72).
September 15, 2015. NOD, rating dated May 27, 2015. (RBA 0119-0126).
B. Adjudication of the post-severance PTSD claim.
April 14, 2008. SOC denies PTSD. (RBA 5410-5427).
April 28, 2008. VA-9, SOC dated 04-14-08. (RBA 5399-5408).
July 1, 2008. SSOC PTSD. (RBA 4580-4583).
July 12, 2008. VA-9, SSOC, May 13, 2008. (RBA 4575-78).
July 29, 2008. VA-9 PTSD claim. (RBA 4558-4566). VA returned attachments. (4567).
May 27, 2015. SSOC denies PTSD. (RBA 0305-26).
June 25, 2015. VA-9, SSOC of 5/27/15 for PTSD. (RBA 0206-09).
II. Statement of the Facts Relevant to the Issues.
The Appellant served honorably in the U.S. Navy from March of 1968 to December of
1971. While on active duty at Naval Air Facility Naples, Italy, he was present when Gary D.
Holland was injured in a C-54 aircraft maintenance incident on February 4, 1969. Holland died
on February 5, 1969. (RBA 9488, 9483-9505). Verification of this death was present in the
Appellant’s claims file on September 21, 1997 as shown in the BVA certified list. (RBA 6109,
6108-12). The death was the first valid stressor in support of a diagnosis of PTSD. However,
the Appellant did not understand that this was the source of his psychological issues initially. He
claimed service connection based on his December 13, 1969, incident and subsequent treatment.
13
He was angry and resentful at that time and was involved in an altercation with the Shore Patrol
in Siganella on December 13, 1969, which resulted in his hospitalization (13-15 December) and
psychiatric treatment with thorazine.5 This incident and subsequent treatment would later be
characterized as a valid stressor in support of a diagnosis of PTSD on September 9, 2006. (RBA
00235, 235-237; 6097). He later underwent outpatient psychiatric treatment on active duty. On
June 26, 1970, he was medicated with Librium6. (RBA 00217-18). His conduct and job
performance declined after Holland was killed. After mental health treatment he improved his
job performance and avoided administrative separation. (RBA 00221-00230). He was a plane
captain on A-6 aircraft at NAS Oceana, (RBA 09507; 09539),Virginia. (RBA 09506-9548).
On September 28, 1973, the VA Regional Office, Detroit, Michigan, received the service
records of the Appellant which contained the record of his in service mental health treatment.
(RBA 09689-09709). This claim for dental treatment resulted in the assignment of VA claim
number C 28 353 461.
After suffering a heart attack in January of 1987 he became to disabled to work. He filed
a second claim for VA benefits on February 27, 1987. (RBA 09479-82).
On March 28, 2003, he was granted service connected benefits at 100% effective July 16,
1992. The Appellant sought an earlier effective date for his benefits. After a hearing at the
regional office he was not provided a verbatim transcript. He reported this to the VA OIG in
Washington and was referred to the Chicago office.
On December 21, 2003, his original claims file was removed from the regional office by
VA OIG Agent Ray Vasil. (RBA 06787). On July 8, 2004, a VA OIG report of investigation
5 Thorazine: a preparation of the hydrochloride of chlorpromazine —formerly a U.S. registered
trademark.
6 Librium: Chlordiazepoxide HCL, the original Chlordiazepoxide HCL and the prototype for the
benzodiazepine compounds. Physicians Desk Reference, 2007, page 3347.
14
was provided to both the VA Regional Office and U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin. (RBA 06707-6728).
The VARO issued a proposal to sever on August 18, 2004. (RBA 6678-6681).
On May 16, 2005, the Appellant was arraigned in the Federal District Court for the E.D.
of Wisconsin, docket 1:05-CR-00118-WCG, U.S. v. Roberts.
The Appellant is required to seek leave of the District Court to attend his BVA hearing
on June 13, 2005, in Washington, D.C., Transcript at (RBA 6164-6208). On August 26, 2005,
the Board denied his appeal. (RBA 6119-6161). He filed his appeal with this Court on
August 30, 2005, docket number 05-2425.
On September 9, 2005, Barton Stichman and Christine Coté appeared in 05-2425 as
counsel for the Appellant. This was the first time the Appellant had legal counsel in his VA
case.
After a trial held November 6-8, 2006, the Appellant was found guilty of accepting
electronic fund transfers of payments of VA benefits. He was sentenced to 48 months, and was
incarcerated from March 2, 2007 to March 7, 2010. He was ordered to pay $ 262, 943.52 in
restitution. The VA OGC filed a notice in 05-2425 under Vet. App. Rule 30 informing the Court
of the conviction. After en banc review the Court issued a decision in Roberts v. Shinseki, 23
Vet.App. 416 ( April 23, 2010).
The Board issued a remand order on September 28, 2012. The VARO essentially said
that the Appellant was convicted, he lost his appeals, and they would not adjudicate the remand.
On November 19, 2013, the Appellant filed a motion and supporting brief with the Board
asking that the benefits be restored at the 100 percent level for mental disability effective July
16, 1992. (RBA 617-679). A hearing was held in Washington, D.C., on February 3, 2014.
Transcript. (RBA 0489-0573). The Board issued another more cryptic order of remand.
(RBA 0026-0029). Also, the case was transferred from the Milwaukee Regional Office to St.
Paul, Minnesota. St. Paul actually began to work on the remand. On March 24, 2015,
15
Dr. O’ Neil indicated that a full initial mental C and P examination and record review would be
required. (RBA 0386-87).
On May 21, 2015, Dr. Marcellino submits a comprehensive mental health C and P report
based on record review and interview with Appellant and wife on May 7, 2015. (RBA 9783-
9814).
A May 27, 2015, VA rating, restores service connection for mental conditions effective
July 16, 1992, but only to 30%. (RBA 274-288; 9744-54, 9769-72). On September 15, 2015, a
notice of disagreement is filed. (RBA 0119-0126).
On January 2, 2013, Appellant filed a Debt Notice of disagreement. Demand for hearing
on the record and full accounting. No response to date. His debt continues to rise with no due
process. On October 15, 2004, the America Legion (POA) letter to VA Dir., C and P Service,
Renee Szybala, demanding a hearing under 38 C.F.R.§§ 42.1-42.47 and a copy of the OIG
report. (RBA 1398-1402). The Appellant has never received the due process required in the
regulations and he received his copy of the OIG report from the VA when he received the
designation of the record in 05-2425. The Appellant documented the due process abuses in this
case in an affidavit dated March 9, 2007, (RBA 1379-1390) and in a deposition de bene esse
taken June 29, 2012. The transcript is in two parts: Part 1 (RBA 10178-10314) and Part 2 (RBA
03269-03288).
11. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
I. WHETHER THE SECRETARY FAILED TO COMPLY WITH
THE ORDER OF THIS COURT IN ROBERTS V. SHINSEKI,
23 VET.APP 416, DATED APRIL 23, 2010.
The Appellant has associated the transcripts of the Grand Jury, trial proceedings, and
court ordered psychiatric evaluation in U.S. v. Roberts, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of
Wisconsin, Docket 05-CR-115, as well as the new VA psychiatric evaluation and in support of
his claim for reinstatement of service connection for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.
No witness in Federal Court testified that the Appellant was not present in the hangar on
February 4, 1969, when Holland was injured. The VA OIG never interviewed any of the men
16
who worked with the Appellant. (RBA 1379-90). The original Navy report was not concerned
with the Appellant, and excluded his statement which was critical of the command. The
Appellant was assigned to NAF Naples. He was not: Absent With Out Leave; on leave; on sick
call; or, away on temporary duty. He was present for duty in the hangar. Michalic v. Cleveland
Tanker, Inc., 364 U.S. 325 (1960), circumstantial evidence is sufficient to establish a fact. In a
truly non-adversarial situation, it would be adequate.
A. The Board failed to comply with 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1)
when it did not adequately state the reasons or bases for
denying reopening the claim for service connection for
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder Based upon new and
material evidence.
A great deal of new and material evidence was provided by the Appellant since the
August 26, 2005, Board decision in this case. The Board failed to provide adequate reasons and
bases for why it declined to reopen the PTSD claim. The C and P examination and report dated
May 21, 2015, (RBA 9783-9818) along with the report prepared for the Federal District Court by
Dr. Dana dated March 14, 2006. (RBA 0238-50), warranted a more detailed review.
When making factual determinations, the Board is required to provide a written statement
of the reasons or bases for its findings and conclusions adequate to enable an appellant to
understand the precise basis for the Board's decision as well as to facilitate review in this Court.
38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1); Allday v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 517, 527 (1995); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1
Vet.App. 49, 56-57 (1990). To comply with this requirement, the Board must analyze the
credibility and probative value of the evidence, account for the evidence that it finds persuasive
or unpersuasive, and provide the reasons for its rejection of any material evidence favorable to
the claimant. Caluza v. Brown,7 Vet. App. 498, 506 (1995), aff'd per curiam, 78 F.3d 604 (Fed.
Cir. 1996) (table); Gilbert, 1 Vet.App. at 57.
We agree that the Board required both new and material evidence in order to review the
merits of a previously denied claim. Jackson v. Principi, 265 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
However, this is not an insurmountable task, and the Appellant has met his burden in this regard.
17
The two new examinations entered in to the record have confirmed that the Appellant has
PTSD, and that he has two stressors, the December 1969 hospitalization and subsequent clinical
treatment and the February 1969 death of Airman Holland.
The Board denied the request for a subpoena which is needed to obtain the Navy Aircraft
Incident Investigation Report from February 1969. This is relevant because the sworn statement
of the Appellant is included in this report. The June 29, 2012, deposition transcript of the
Appellant explains why this is important. The transcript is in two parts: Part 1 (RBA 10178-
10314) and Part 2 (RBA 03269-03288). Also included in the record are the transcripts of the trial
testimony: Jury Trial, Day One (RBA 11317-11574); Jury Trial, Day Two: (RBA 10315-10581);
Jury Trial, Day Three (RBA 01743-01890); and Jury Trial, Sentencing (RBA 01646-01742).
The Navy witnesses called by the government at trial did not testify that the Appellant was not
present on February 4, 1969, when the fatal incident occurred.
In Moore v. Shinseki, 555 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2009), the Federal Circuit discussed the
necessity of reviewing the entire record.
“By regulation, the VA is specifically required to assess a disability "in relation
to its history" when making disability ratings determinations:
Over a period of many years, a veteran's disability claim may require reratings
in accordance with changes in laws, medical knowledge and his or her physical
or mental condition. It is thus essential, both in the examination and in the evaluation
of disability, that each disability be viewed in relation to its history. 38 C.F.R. § 4.1.
"Different examiners, at different times, will not describe the same disability in the
same language" and "a change for the better or worse" in a veteran's condition
"may not be accurately . . . described" in a single report. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.2.
Accordingly, "[i]t is the responsibility of the rating specialist to interpret reports of
examination in the light of the whole recorded history, reconciling the various reports
into a consistent picture so that the current rating may accurately reflect the elements
of disability present." Id.; see also Schafrath v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 589, 594 (1991)
(evaluating a current disability in light of its complete recorded history "operate[s]
to protect claimants against adverse decisions based on a single, incomplete or
inaccurate report"). Evaluation of a disability in light of its history is particularly
important in the context of psychiatric disorders. Because "psychiatric disorders
abate and recur," the VA is obligated to evaluate them "not by reference to isolated
periods of activity or remission, but by assessing the effects of the disease or injury
over the history of the condition." Davis v. Principi, 276 F.3d 1341, 1345
(Fed. Cir. 2002). Thus, VA regulations specifically provide that a rating for
a psychiatric disorder must be "based on all the evidence of record that bears on
occupational and social impairment rather than solely on the examiner's assessment
of the level of disability at the moment of the examination." 38 C.F.R. § 4.126(a).”
18
Since the last Board decision there have been two examinations and reports. While the C
and P did not endorse full PTSD criteria under the new DSM-5, it resulted in a restoration of 30
percent benefits under DC 9434. The report of Dr. Dana concluded that the Appellant did suffer
from PTSD as a result of his military service.
See McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet.App. 79, 85 (2006). The McLendon court
concluded that the Board's assessment derived from negative evidence does not constitute
substantive evidence.
See Gabrielson v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 36, 40 (1994) (noting that the Board may not evade
the reasons and bases requirement merely by adopting another opinion that fails to discuss all
evidence supporting the veteran's position).
Factual findings are reviewed by the Court under the clearly erroneous standard under 38
U.S.C. § 7261(a)(4). See Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 49, 53 (1990); Russo v. Brown, 9
Vet.App. 46, 50 (1996). The failure to acknowledge the significance of the two new
examination reports and the trial testimony is clear error.
In Stefl v. Nicholson, 21 Vet.App. 120, 123 (2007), the Court discussed the framework
for adjudicating a claim and the requirements for an adequate medical opinion:
“The Court agrees with the appellant that the examination report is inadequate.
An opinion is adequate where it is based upon consideration of the veteran's prior
medical history and examinations and also describes the disability, if any, in
sufficient detail so that the Board's "'evaluation of the claimed disability will be a
fully informed one.'" Ardison v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 405, 407 (1994) (quoting
Green v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 121, 124 (1991).
* * *
This is particularly important when there is an approximate balance of positive
and negative evidence in an appellant's particular case because a claimant is
entitled to the benefit of the doubt. 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b).”
Id. at 123.
The medical opinion used to sever the benefits of the Appellant was inadequate as
discussed in the dissenting opinion in Roberts v. Shinseki, 23 Vet.App. 416, 442-450 (2010).
The medical opinion used to sever was an outlier, a majority of the clinicians that had
treated the Appellant over the years agree that he suffers from severe PTSD as a consequence of
his military service. The two new medical opinions alone warrant reopening.
19
When the Board relies on a medical advisory opinion obtained pursuant to 38 U.S.C. §
7109(a), that opinion must be adequate. D'Aries v. Peake, 22 Vet.App. 97, 104 (2008). A
medical opinion is considered adequate "where it is based upon consideration of the veteran's
prior medical history and examinations and also describes the disability, if any, in sufficient
detail so that the Board's '"evaluation of the claimed disability will be a fully informed one.'"
The two new opinions are adequate, the opinion obtained for the express purpose of severing the
benefits of the Appellant was not.
II. THE SECRETARY HAS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH
THE CONGRESSIONALLY MANDATED DUE PROCESS
PROTECTIONS REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF BENEFITS
FRAUD FOUND IN HIS OWN REGULATIONS, 38 C.F.R.
§§ 42.1-42.47, IMPLEMENTING THE PROGRAM FRAUD CIVIL
REMEDIES ACT OF 1986, AND THUS DEPRIVED THE APPELLANT
AND HIS FAMILY OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
Congress has mandated a process and procedure for the Investigation and adjudication of
allegations of benefits fraud. The Secretary has promulgated those regulations at 38 C.F.R.§§
42.1-42.47 but has refused to comply with them in this case or any other benefits fraud case.
The Appellant, through his American Legion Veterans Service Officer, by letter dated
October 15, 2004, demanded a hearing under 38 C.F.R.§§ 42.1-42.47. (RBA 1399, 1398-1402).
That hearing has never been provided and an accurate determination of damages was not
made.
The Veteran’s Benefits Administration, the Board, and this Court are without legal
authority or jurisdiction to make an initial determination of benefits fraud and their actions in
this case have been ultra vires. The process used to sever the benefits of the Appellant is not
compliant with the due process standards found in both the regulations and the Administrative
Procedures Act.
The Appellant was not given a copy of the VA OIG report, not informed of the specific
allegations against him, and could not respond in front of a neutral finder of fact.
This Court discussed agency interpretation of regulations in American Signature Inc., v.
United States, 598 F.3d 816 (Fed. Cir. 2010):
20
“In general, “[t]he agency’s construction of its own regulation is ‘of controlling
weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’”
Reizenstein v. Shinseki, 583 F.3d 1331, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing Cathedral
Candle Co. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 400 F.3d 1352, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945);
Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000); Auer v. Robbins, 519
U.S. 452, 461 (1997); Gose v. United States Postal Serv., 451 F.3d 831, 836
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (“As a general rule, we must defer to an agency's interpretations
of the regulations it promulgates, as long as the regulation is ambiguous and the
agency's interpretation is neither plainly erroneous nor inconsistent with the
regulation.” (citing Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 126 S.Ct. 904, 163 L.Ed.
748 (2006)).”
See Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115 ; 115 S. Ct. 552, 555 (1994) (citing King v. St.
Vincent's Hospital, 502 U.S. 215, 220-21, n. 9, 116 L. Ed. 2d 578, 112 S. Ct. 570 (1991))
(“interpretive doubt is to be resolved in the veteran's favor”).
III. THE BOARD ERRED WHEN IT ENDORSED VIOLATIONS
BY THE SECRETARY OF THE FIFTH AND SIXTH
AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
RESULTING IN THE UNLAWFUL DEPRIVATION OF THE
LIBERTY AND PROPERTY OF THE APPELLANT.
A. Free Standing Constitutional Claims.
The Supreme Court has strongly implied that certain due process protections are
applicable to the adjudicative administrative proceedings associated with social security
disability claim hearings. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401-02 (1971). VA benefits
proceedings involve similar interests. See Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473
U.S. 305, 333 (1985); 38 U.S.C. § 1110.
The Appellant was denied a full and fair hearing regarding the benefits fraud allegations.
He was deprived of his liberty (incarceration) and property (benefits) without due process of law.
Veteran’s disability benefits are nondiscretionary, statutorily mandated benefits and he is entitled
to procedural due process. See Cook v. Principi, 318 F.3d 1334, 1350,1352 (Fed. Cir. 2002);
Cushman v. Shinseki, 576 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2009); and In re: R. Greg Bailey, 182 F.3d 860,
869-70 (Fed. Cir. 1999), 38 U.S.C. § 7292 (d)(1), Id.
21
The Appellant was clearly denied procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution. See Pierre v. West, 211 F.3d 1363, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
The ultra vires fraud adjudications being conducted by the Secretary are express and
direct violations of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment and the right to notice and an
opportunity to challenge evidence and charges under the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. See Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970) (notice), and Ohio v. Roberts,
448 U.S. 56 (1980); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (confrontation).
In evaluating due process claims, an inquiry must be made as to whether the practice
“offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to
be ranked as fundamental.” Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105, 54 S.Ct. 330, 332, 78
L.Ed. 674 (1934). As stated by Justice Frankfurter, due process:
“embodies a system of rights based on moral principles so deeply imbedded in the
traditions and feelings of our people as to be deemed fundamental to a civilized
society as conceived by our whole history. Due process is that which comports
with the deepest notions of what is fair and right and just.”
B. The regulations found in 38 C.F.R.§ 14.561 and
§§ 42.1-42.47 must be followed in order to comply
with the due process requirements of the Administrative
Procedures Act.
§ 42.1 Basis and purpose.
(a) Basis. This part implements the Program Fraud Civil Remedies
Act of 1986, * * * codified at 31 U.S.C. 3801-3812. Section 3809
* * * requires * * * the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, to promulgate
regulations necessary to implement the provisions of the statute.
(b) Purpose. This part:
(1) Establishes and provides the only administrative procedures and
actions for imposing civil penalties and assessments against persons who
make, submit, or present, or cause to be made, submitted, or presented,
false, fictitious, or fraudulent claims or written statements to authorities
or to their agents, and
(2) Specifies the hearing and appeal rights of persons subject to allegations
of liability for such penalties and assessments.
[53 FR 16710, May 11, 1988]
22
C. The $150,000.00 limit found in the PFCRA is not applicable in this case.
Unless and until a complaint is issued under the regulations and a full and final
determination of damages is made there are no damages to review. Also, the due process
protections of the regulations are to be used in each and every fraud allegation adjudication. The
damages enhancement provisions of the PFCRA are optional, not mandatory.
D. Employees of the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs
cannot adjudicate benefits fraud allegations.
This case is the perfect example of the abject failure of the due process regulation and
procedures in the Veterans Benefits Administration. The use of Agency employees at every
level of the claims fraud adjudication process is contrary to the Administrative Procedures Act.
The APA makes use of Administrative Law Judges who are appointed in accordance with title 5
U.S. Code and are detailed to agencies, not employed by them. Here we have the Director,
Compensation and Pension Service, the Director of the Milwaukee Regional Office and other
employees directly involved in adjudicating the claims of the Appellant while coordinating
efforts to have him prosecuted. They have access to his communications to the Secretary and to
other agency officials and to members of Congress.
Veterans are not third class citizens. They deserve, and the Appellant demands, the same
due process afforded a Social Security benefits claimant. No more, no less.
Applicants for VA benefits, even if ultimately deemed not entitled to those benefits, have
a constitutionally protected property interest in those benefits under the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Cushman v. Shinseki, 576 F.3d 1290, 1297–98
(Fed. Cir. 2009); see also Cogburn v. Shinseki, 24 Vet.App. 205, 209–10 (2010). They cannot
be denied those benefits without due process of law, which includes notice and a fair opportunity
to be heard. Cushman, 576 F.3d at 1296.
The VA claims adjudication process is intended to be ex parte, claimant-friendly and
non-adversarial. Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
23
Fraud is quasi criminal in nature. An allegation of fraud is inherently adversarial. Once
an allegation of fraud has been made the PFCRA must be followed. Employees of the VBA may
not conduct fraud adjudications.
On December 29, 2003, the Appellant wrote to Secretary Principi. He asked that his
benefits claims file be made available for review. (RBA 6772-6785). In a letter to Secretary
Principi dated November 22, 2004, he reviewed the facts of his case and indicated that his right
of due process had been violated. He clearly indicated that his Navy psychiatric hospital stay
was a stressor for the PTSD claim. (RBA 6484-97).
On November 29, 2004, a VARO FOIA officer advised the Appellant that his file was
with the OIG in Hines, Illinois, and he must obtain the report of investigation there.
(RBA 6523). This is a snipe hunt. See the memo from John Kuehl to the VA Medical Center in
Milwaukee advising them not to give the Appellant records. (RBA 6524).
Mr. Wilkerson sent a memo to the Service Center Manager, VARO, Milwaukee, on
December 13, 2004. He requests that benefits be reinstated, and that the VA OIG report be
provided as the U.S. Attorney was involved. (RBA 6503-05).
Renee Szybala responded to the November 22, 2004, letter on January 4, 2005, and
called it a valid Notice of Disagreement. (RBA 1441).
Thursday, January 27, 2005, a series of VA email messages were exchanged.
(RBA 1416-19). At 11:41 a.m., Debi Bevins, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Veterans
Affairs, inquires “Have we heard any news on the prosecution of Keith Roberts?” (RBA 1413).
At 1:54 p.m., Mr. Vasil says Roberts had telephoned his supervisor: “. . . Roberts
informed him that just knowing about an accident should be enough to get PTSD; it is not
required that you be present.7 I think that is most likely false. . . . because Roberts is litigious, he
(AUSA) also wants it not to appear we are railroading him with only partial information . . .
7 Suozzi v. Brown, 10 Vet.App. 307 (CAVC 1997).
24
Roberts has called the AUSA and has demanded our report, which of course he did not release.”
(RBA 1413).
Renee Szybala, a licensed attorney serving as the Director, Compensation and Pension
Service, responded at 2:28 p.m. She indicated that Roberts’ letter was a valid notice of
disagreement regarding the fraud charges. She informed Jon Baker, VARO Milwaukee, of the
December 1969, assault and hospitalization. “In the interest of full disclosure, I also have a
letter on this case from the American Legion, dated October 15, 2004, to which I have not yet
responded. The fraud for which Mr. Roberts’ service connection was severed was uncovered,
investigated and reported by the VA OIG. To respond to the Legion’s letter, we need to confer
with the OIG and have had trouble connecting. When we do, we’ll ask them the question about
prosecution, too. My guess is, however, that this case would not interest a U.S. Attorney. Those
offices have monetary and other thresholds that a case like this likely doesn’t meet.” 8 (RBA
1416).
On April 26, 2005, Mr. Vasil provided the only testimony to the Federal Grand Jury.
(The prosecution is predicated on the finality of the VA benefits severance). Mr. Vasil failed to
explain that for VA benefits to be paid for PTSD one stressor is needed, and the Appellant had
two. He fails to indicate that Dr. Harms referred the Appellant to Dr. Kliese, who based his
diagnosis on the December, 1969 psychiatric hospitalization. (RBA 231-234). The portion of
the military records Mr. Vasil included in his report document that stressful event. (RBA 9680-
81). When examined by Dr. Hastings of the VA Mr. Roberts reported the aircraft accident along
with the December 1969, psychiatric hospitalization. See Hastings report (RBA 235-237; 9261-
63).
In his dissent in Cook v. Principi, 318 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2002), Judge Gajarsa
discussed due process and said that “Because breaches in these cases cannot merely be
8 A properly run U.S. Attorney’s Office may have turned away the Appellant’s case. But Mr.
Biskupic was working to gain favor with the executive branch to extricate himself from the Karl
Rove “hit list”. See United States v. Georgia Thompson, 484 F.3d 877 (7th Cir. 2007), another
politically motivated prosecution.
25
overlooked, I turn to the central constitutional inquiry: what process was due in light of “the
practicalities and particularities of the case” Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). In determining what process is due, the court must employ a flexible
balancing test that takes into account the particular facts and circumstances, as the need for
procedural safeguards varies with the situation: “due process, unlike some legal rules, is not a
technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.” Cafeteria
Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961). “Due process is flexible and calls for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
481 (1972).” Cook, Supra, at 1354.
The Appellant has raised a constitutional claim which meets the requirements set forth in
Cook, supra., based on the “particularities and peculiarities of the case”. Accord Cushman v.
Shinseki, 576 F.3d 1290 ( Fed . Cir. 2009).
See Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 545 (1959). The Supreme Court has long
recognized that a federal agency is obliged to abide by the regulations it promulgates. See also
Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 372 (1957); Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 267 (1954);
and See Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115 ; 115 S. Ct. 552, 555 (1994) (citing King v. St.
Vincent's Hospital, 502 U.S. 215, 220-21, n. 9, 116 L. Ed. 2d 578, 112 S. Ct. 570 (1991).
Mr. Justice Jackson in his dissent in Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill et al, 332
U.S. 380; 68 S. Ct. 1 (1947), could have been writing of this case when he observed:
“It is very well to say that those who deal with the Government should turn square corners. But
there is no reason why the square corners should constitute a one way street.”
The deprivation of liberty and financial loss suffered by the Appellant due to the conduct
of the Secretary is a Constitutionally impermissible denial of benefits under the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47
L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976): “The interest of an individual in continued receipt of [Social Security
disability] benefits is a statutorily created property interest protected by the Fifth Amendment.”
26
(Citations omitted); Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 128 (1985). The Appellant deserves his
Congressionally mandated due process.
E. The agency Office of General Counsel failed to
meet it’s obligations to the Appellant as the
reviewing official under 38 C.F.R.§ 14.561
and §§ 42.1-42.47.
As reviewing officials, attorneys of the VA Office of General Counsel have express
obligations to veterans accused of benefits fraud.
38 C.F.R. § 14.561: Administrative action prior to submission.
“Before a submission is made to the U.S. Attorney in cases involving personnel
or claims, the General Counsel, if the file is in Central Office, or the Regional
Counsel at the regional office, hospital or center, if the file is in the regional
office or other field facility, will first ascertain that necessary administrative or
adjudicatory (forfeiture (see Pub. L. 86-222; 73 Stat. 452), etc.), action has been
taken; except that in urgent cases such as breaches of the peace, disorderly
conduct, trespass, robbery, or where the evidence may be lost by delay, or
prosecution barred by the statute of limitations, submission to the U.S. Attorney
will be made immediately.”
In the Appellee’s response to the Appellant’s supplemental brief the Secretary adopted
the position that the VA OGC has no role to play in benefits fraud cases. (05-2425, Supp. Br. of
Appellee 4-6).
The obligation of the VA OGC to refer all fraud allegations to the OIG for investigation
does not conflict with the PFCRA. It has no bearing on the obligation of the VA OGC to
conduct a review of benefits fraud investigations.
The Secretary maintains that the word “claims” in 38 C.F.R. § 14.561 refers to contractor
claims. The VA has a backlog of over half a million benefits claims. They probably adjudicate
several hundred contractor claims a year. When § 14.561 is read in the context of the PFCRA
benefits claims disputes receive special review. Benefits fraud allegations must be processed
under the PFCRA. Even if a decision is made to expedite the referral of a benefits fraud case to
the DOJ, it must be made by a VA reviewing officer. The failure of the VA OGC to provide
oversight of OIG regarding benefits fraud since 1988 is inexplicable.
27
Whether an agency’s interpretation of its regulations announced for the first time in a
brief is entitled to deference has generated considerable authority both in the Supreme Court and
in this Court. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462-63 (1997); Reizenstein v. Shinseki, 583
F.3d 1331, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Abbott Labs. v. United States, 573 F.3d 1327, 1332-33 (Fed.
Cir. 2009); Caribbean Ispat Ltd. v. United States, 450 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Where
the agency's interpretation seeks to advance its litigating position, deference is typically not
afforded to the agency's position announced in a brief. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp.,
488 U.S. 204, 213 (1988).
See Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115 ; 115 S. Ct. 552, 555 (1994) (citing King v. St.
Vincent's Hospital, 502 U.S. 215, 220-21, n. 9, 116 L. Ed. 2d 578, 112 S. Ct. 570 (1991))
(“interpretive doubt is to be resolved in the veteran's favor”).
It is a well-settled principle of statutory interpretation that one must first look to the
literal language of a statute prior to resorting to secondary sources to determine legislative intent,
and, if the statutory terms are plain and do not lead to absurd or impracticable consequences,
then the literal language of the statute is the sole evidence of the ultimate legislative intent.
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485, 490 (1917); see also West Virginia Univ. Hosps.,
Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98-99 (1991); 2A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory
Construction 46.01-.04 (5th ed. 1992) (plain-meaning rule).
The PFCRA and 38 C.F.R. § 42.1 et seq define an essential role for VA General Counsel
in benefits fraud cases.
An agency interpretation that eviscerates regulatory language is per se inconsistent with
the regulation and may be accorded no deference.
A hearing was held in the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations to review the VA Office of General Counsel on June 30, 2010.
In his testimony Matthew B. Tully, Esquire, pointed out that government attorneys are
held to a higher standard of ethics than those in private practice. A government attorney must
look at the broad public interest, not just a narrow litigation position. Berger v. United States,
28
295 U.S. 78 (1935); Bulloch v. United States, 763 F.2d 1115, 1125 (10th Cir. 1985) in which
Judge McKay noted in his dissent that concealment of information by the government during
discovery was “made even more egregious” by the government lawyers responsibility to seek
justice and to develop a full and fair record.
The Appellant was wrongfully stripped of his compensation benefits. He was denied
access to his own records and the report which was used to make allegations against him at a
critical phase of his adjudication.
Withholding of Information.
The VA refused to disclose the VA OIG investigation to the Appellant at a critical period
in the defense of both his disability benefits and his liberty. Both the Appellant and his
American Legion service officers made numerous formal requests for his claims file and the
OIG report.
See the January 27, 2005, email from Renee Szybala (RBA 1416-1419).
The government’s withholding of information constitutes a violation of due process.
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The government must disclose to the defense evidence
that is both favorable to the accused and “material either to guilt or to punishment.” Id. at 87. In
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), the Court clarified that the Brady rule extends to
impeachment and exculpatory evidence. See Id. at 154-55.
The Supreme Court has stated that the United States Attorney (VA General Counsel) is
the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all and whose
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case but that justice shall be
done. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 1948, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999)
(citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935).
While this was a civil matter, the Secretary was well aware of the criminal dimension of
the case as he had made the referral of the matter to the U.S. Attorney absent proper notice and
an opportunity to be heard before a neutral fact finder as the regulations require.
29
12. CONCLUSION
The opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims in Roberts v. Shinseki, 23
Vet.App. 416 (2010), which ordered a remand and reconsideration of the depression and
dysthymia claims of the Appellant have not been fully complied with. The Court should order
the benefits raised from the 30 percent rating to a 100 percent rating effective July 16, 1992 to
the present. The Court should also order a hearing in accordance with 38 C.F.R. §42.1 et seq. to
be held to resolve the remaining evidentiary issues and to make findings of fact and rulings of
law as to the indebtedness, if any, the Appellant and his family have to the U.S. Department of
Veterans Affairs. The Board failed to properly review the new and material evidence provided
by the Appellant which supports his contention that he was and remains entitled to a review of
the fraud allegation against him before a Title 5 Administrative Law Judge in accordance with
38 C.F.R. § 42.1 et seq.
This Court should order the benefits of the Appellant restored forthwith.
“While there is no absolute definition of what is [a] reasonable [amount of] time, we
know that it may encompass months, occasionally a year or two, but not several
years or a decade.” Erspamer v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 3, 10 (1990).
“Let justice be done though the heavens should fall.”
-John Adams, letter to Elbridge Gerry, December 5, 1777
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Robert P. Walsh
___________________________________ Date: June 29, 2017
Robert P. Walsh-Michigan Bar P-42833
Attorney for Claimant-Appellant
Keith A. Roberts
Law Office of Robert P. Walsh
Two West Michigan Avenue, Suite 301
Battle Creek, Michigan 49017-7002
Telephone (269) 962-9693
Telecopier (269) 962-9592
E-mail: rpwalsh@SBCglobal.net
30